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EXTENDING BATSON V. KENTUCKY TO THE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S USE OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: THE DEMISE
OF THE CHALLENGE WITHOUT CAUSE
[I]n criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is, in favo-
rem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious
species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without showing
any cause at all; which is called a peremptory challenge: a
provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for
which our English laws are justly famous.'
—William Blackstone
The peremptory challenge is a procedural device allowing each
party in a civil or criminal proceeding to remove a certain number
of prospective jurors without explanation and regardless of the
jurors' qualifications for service. 2 Historically, the peremptory chal-
lenge was used to ensure that criminal defendants, confronting the
loss of liberty, and perhaps life, had every opportunity to be tried
before a jury with which they felt comfortable. 8 As the above epi-
graph indicates, such legal theorists as Blackstone have recognized
the peremptory's ability to provide the assurance of fairness to
criminal defendants facing serious charges.'
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution state that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.' The United States Supreme
Court has long acknowledged the peremptory challenge as one of
the most effective means of ensuring fair trials. 6 For this reason,
courts have traditionally left the privilege of peremptory challenges
free from judicial control.' When courts have imposed restrictions,
these restrictions have been minimal. 8 The Supreme Court, recog-
t 4 WILLIAM BLACKS'IONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
2 See Robert M. O'Connell, Note, The Elimination of Racism from fury Selection: Challenging
the Peremptory Challenge, 32 B.C. L. REv. 433, 436 (1991).
See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *353).
4 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
U.S. CoNs•r. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
°Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
7 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892); State
v. Thompson, 206 P.2d 1037, 1039 (1949)).
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nizing that the peremptory challenge is one of the most important
rights afforded to the accused, has condemned as unjust any system
of empaneling a jury that restricts the defendant's use of peremp-
tory challenges. 9
The Supreme Court has also, however, condemned any jury
empanelment system that permits racially discriminatory selection
procedures.'° In 1880, the Supreme Court held in Strauder v. West
Virginia that the State violates an African-American defendant's
equal protection rights by trying the defendant before a jury from
which members of the defendant's race have been excluded." Over
a century later, in the 1986 decision of Batson v. Kentucky, the Su-
preme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits prosecutors from using peremptory
challenges to keep racial minorities from serving as jurors.' 2 The
Batson Court declined to comment on the scope of the decision.' 3
As a result, the Court's ruling created a tension between equal
protection limits placed on discriminatory challenges and the crim-
inal defendant's right to use peremptory strikes."
9
 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1894).
'° See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986).
" 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1880).
12 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (1986).
" Id. at 89 n.12. In addition to criminal defendants, Batson left open the status of the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by civil litigants and the viability of Sixth
Amendment challenges. The Supreme Court held in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990),
that the Sixth Amendment was inapplicable to peremptory challenges. Id. at 478. See infra
notes 155-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Holland decision. After Batson,
a number of federal courts considered the application of the Batson rule to civil litigants.
These cases include Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th Cir. 1988),
rev'd en bane, 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991); Wilson
v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163, 164-65 (8th Cir. 1988); Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687,
689 (N.D. ill. 1988), order vacated sub nom. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 153 (7th Cir.
1988); Clark v. City of Bridgeport. 645 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D. Conn. 1986); Esposito v.
Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Corm. 1985). For a further discussion of these cases,
see O'Connell, supra note 2, at 446-51. For a discussion and listing of state cases see Timothy
Patton, The Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges in Civil Litigation: Practice, Procedure and
Review, 19 Tax. TECH. L. REV, 921 (1988).
A number of state courts have interpreted their constitutions to find a right to a fair
trial for the state, and as such have applied the Batson rule, if not reasoning, to defense
counsel. See Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges:
On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. Ray. 808, 823-24, 842 n.95 (1989).
See infra notes 356-403 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of state treatment
of defendant strikes.
" See Batson, 476 U.S. at 125-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)(if prosecutor strikes can be
limited, defendant strikes can be limited). For purposes of this note, the terms peremptory
challenge and peremptory strike will be used interchangeably.
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In response, lower courts differed in their application and
interpretation of the decision.' 5 Many courts applied Batson only in
limited circumstances.! 6 Generally, the Batson doctrine was applied
when the defendant was a member of a cognizable racial group and
could show that the prosecutor was excluding other members of
the same racial group from the jury by means of peremptory chal-
lenges.°
Although many lower courts read Batson narrowly, during 1991
the Supreme Court actively broadened the Batson rule prohibiting
racially discriminatory challenges.' 8 First, in Powers v. Ohio, the
Court ruled that criminal defendants may object to race-based per-
emptory exclusions whether or not the defendant is the same race
as the removed juror. 13 Then, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
the Court extended standing to assert a Batson claim to civil liti-
gants. 2° As a result of the expansion of Batson, only the criminal
defendant retained power to use the peremptory strike as originally
conceived. 2 ' These two United States Supreme Court decisions,
however, placed the viability of the criminal defendant's discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges in doubt. 22
On November 4, 1991, the Court certified Georgia v. McCollum
for review. 23 McCollum presented an opportunity for the Justices to
IS O'Connell, supra note 2, at 434 n.11.
See supra note 137.
17 Powers v. Ohio, 11 l S. Ct. 1364, 1375 (1991). This narrow interpretation is justified
in light of justice White's characterization of Batson as a remedy for a specific ill:
1 agree that ... Swain should be overruled. 1 do so because Swain itself indicated
that the presumption of legitimacy with respect to the striking of black venire
persons could be overcome by evidence that over a period of time the prose-
cution had consistently excluded blacks from petit juries. This should have
warned prosecutors that using peremptories to exclude blacks on the assump-
tion that no black juror could fairly judge a black defendant would violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
It appears, however, that the practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks
from petit juries in cases with black defendants remains widespread, so much
so that I agree that an opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this
occurs.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). This limited application
may also have been in deference to the importance and historical acceptance of the peremp-
tory challenge to criminal defendants. See infra notes 35-48, 68-76 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the history of peremptory challenges.
18 See Georgia v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 112 S.
Ct. 2348 (1992).
19 I I 1 S. Ct. at 1373-74.
2 ') 111  S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
21 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2352 (1992).
22 See Edmorksan, Ill S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991).
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address the viability of the criminal defendant's right to exclude
potential jurors without cause in the wake of their recent decisions. 24
At the time McCollum was certified, ample reason already existed to
believe that the Court was willing to extend Batson to the criminal
defendant's use of peremptory challenges. 23
Since Batson was decided, commentators have argued that a
criminal defendant's use of discriminatory challenges to strike po-
tential jurors cannot offend the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment for two reasons: first, the criminal defen-
dant is not a state actor, 26 and second, the State does not have
standing to challenge the exclusion." This note analyzes how the
Court's decisions in Powers and Edmonson created precedent circum-
venting these noted obstacles. This note also discusses how the
Court's 1991 decisions went beyond the ostensible issues of each
case and critically examines how the Court laid the necessary foun-
dation for declaring the use of the peremptory strike by the defense
unconstitutional.
Section I of this note examines the history and purpose of the
peremptory challenge as a criminal defendant's device and exam-
ines the cases, leading to and including Batson, that limited the use
of racially discriminatory jury selection practices. 23 Section II scru-
tinizes the Powers decision and its holding that criminal defendants
have standing to object to discriminatory juror strikes regardless of
whether the defendant and juror share a racial identity. 29 Section
III considers the Edmonson decision and its holding that civil litigants
are state actors, subject to Fourteenth Amendment constraints when
they employ peremptory strikes. 30
 Section IV focuses on the lower
courts' treatment of the criminal defendant's use of peremptory
challenges and presents the McCollum decision and its holdings'
24 See McCollum, 405 S.E.2d at 689.
25
 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, l„ dissenting).
26 See Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 811-20; Harry Zirlin, Note, Unrestricted Use of Per-
emptory Challenges by Criminal Defendants and Their Counsel: The Other Side of the One Color Jury,
34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 227, 238-43 (1989). Zirlin also asserts that the criminal defense
strikes are constitutional as the state has no Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Id,
at 243-47. Holland v. Illinois renders the Sixth Amendment inapplicable to peremptory
strikes. See infra notes 155-73 and accompanying text.
27 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of] ury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,198 (1989); Goldwasser, supra note 13,
at 820 & n.74,
28 See infra notes 35-154 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 155-250 and accompanying text.
3G See infra notes 251-354 and accompanying text.
8 ' See infra notes 355-532 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Section V analyzes how the Supreme Court, by means of its
recent decisions, laid the groundwork for the determination that
the State may challenge, on Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion grounds, peremptory strikes asserted by the criminal defen-
dant.32 This section also discusses how Powers provided a solution
to the prosecution's lack of standing and how the Court's reasoning
in Edmonson created a means for the State to argue that the criminal
defendant is a state actor. 33 Finally, this section criticizes the Su-
preme Court's resolution of the tension between defendants' rights
and race-neutral jury selection proceedings at the expense of a
traditional criminal defendant's safeguard. 34
I. THE ROLE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN AMERICAN JURY
TRIALS
The American justice system purposely favors the accused in
order to ensure a fair trial and to assure the criminal defendant
that the sides will be evenly balanced. 35 The United States Supreme
Court has held a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice. 36 The Sixth Amendment
requires that the defendant's jury be impartial." Defendants have
traditionally employed peremptory challenges as means to secure
this impartial jury. 38
Because of the peremptory challenge's historic importance, ob-
servers have doubted the Supreme Court's willingness to limit the
use of peremptory strikes." In the 1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky,
however, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's use of racially
motivated strikes violates a defendant's equal protection rights. 4°
52 See infra notes 533-96 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 550-86 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 588-96 and accompanying text.
35 DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANTS RIGHTS TODAY 3 (1976). According to Fellman:
[O]ur law is generally described as a defendant's law, in contrast with other
legal systems which emphasize the necessities of the prosecution and give prior-
ity to the interests of society in the apprehension and conviction of criminals.
We, too, are concerned with the suppression of crime, but we are equally
concerned with the necessities of justice and respect for man's dignity.
Id. (footnote omitted),
36 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see also FELLMAN, supra note 35, at 162.
" U.S. GONST. amend. VI.
" See FELLMAN, supra note 35, at 187.
36 See Eric L. Chase, Peremptory Challenges, in 8 THE GUIDE To AMERICAN LAW 175, 177
(1984); The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 173 (1990).
10 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
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Batson, the Court's initial restriction on racially motivated peremp-
tory challenges, only reached that exercise that infringed upon the
defendant's. rights.'"
A. The Peremptory Challenge as a Traditional Defendant Right
The framers of the United States Constitution were careful to
include trial by jury as a fundamental right afforded to the criminal
defendant. 42
 The inclusion of this right reflects the jury trial's im-
portant role in protecting the accused from government oppres-
sion. 43
 In 1968, the Supreme Court held that the right to a jury
trial in serious criminal cases is a constitutional right that a state
cannot abridge." Thus, the Supreme Court has held that trial by
jury is a fundamental right, essential to the American system of
justice, and guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amend ment. 45
The Supreme Court has also held that the right to a fair trial
includes a right to impartial jurors. 46 The Court has noted that it is
4 ' Id. at 89 n.12.
42 See FELLMAN, supra note 35, at 161.
Article III of the United States Constitution secures the right to trial by jury for criminal
defendants. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments underscore the jury trial's importance to the
American system of justice by requiring a grand jury indictment for capital cases and by
requiring that juries be impartial. Article III, § 2 states:
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment shall be by Jury; and
such Trials shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger . .
The Sixth Amendment requires:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law
4' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (quoting Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24, 31 (1965)).
44 Id. at 149, 154. Because the Duncan Court considered the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury a fundamental principle of liberty and justice, it was incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment and protected against state action. Id. at 149-50. The Court noted,
however, that a state could accept waivers of jury trials and refuse to provide jury trials for
petty offenses. Id. at 158.
45 /d. at 149.
46
 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
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"obviously fundamental to fairness that a jury' means an 'impartial
jury.'"47 The peremptory challenge is a traditional means for secur-
ing an impartial jury."
The peremptory challenge takes place during the final mo-
ments of jury selection. 49 A jury is selected in the following manner:
(1) a venire is summoned; (2) challenges to the venire are consid-
ered; (3) individual venire members are subject to voir dire exam-
ination; (4) jurors are challenged for cause; and (5) jurors are
peremptorily challenged. 50 The venire, or jury panel, is the group
of citizens chosen for jury service, generally in a random manner,
from a list of qualifiedjurors. 5 ' If the defendant believes that the
state improperly drew the entire venire, or believes the venire can-
not be fair because of exposure to pre-trial publicity, the defendant
can request that the panel be discharged. 52
Once a venire is accepted, individual jurors are randomly se- .
lected to undergo voir dire, a face-to-face questioning usually con-
ducted by the judge, for the purpose of determining if the juror is
able to hear the case without prejudice. 53 During voir dire, counsel
may bar a prospective juror from serving as a member of the jury
through two mechanisms: the challenge for cause and the peremp-
tory challenge. 54
Challenges for cause are made when attorneys believe they can
show that a prospective juror is biased against the client. 55 Although
challenges for cause are unlimited, they are subject to significant
judicial control. 56 Counsel must convince the judge that a prospec-
tive juror is biased before the juror is removed." For cause chal-
lenges may also be subject to statutory control. 55 For example, state
rules may require that the judge examine a prospective juror before
12 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 181-82 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 722 (1961)).
" Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
49 See Rita J. Simon & Prentice Marshall, The fury System, in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
IN LAW AND AcrioN 211, 217 (Stuart S. Nagel ed„ 1972).
55 Id. at 215-17.
51 Id. at 215; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1864a (1986).
52 Simon & Marshall, supra note 49, at 215.
55 Id. at 216.
54 JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 139-40 (1977); Stephen A. Saltzburg
& Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Croup Rep-
resentation, 41 Mn. L. Ray. 337, 339-40 (1982).
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 54, at 340.
56 Id.; see also VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 143.
52 VAN DYKE, supra DOW 54, at 140.
55 See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 54, at 340.
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counsel is allowed to ask questions. 59
 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has noted that any effort to discover hidden racial prejudices could
alienate certain prospective jurors. 6°
These limitations on voir dire questioning create barriers in-
hibiting the discovery of subtle biases and attitudes that obscure
impartiality. 6 ' A party may have difficulty obtaining adequate proof
to support the for cause challenge, especially when an attorney or
client is acting upon a hunch that the prospective juror holds sub-
conscious prejudices. 62 As a result, commentators have criticized the
for cause challenge as being an ineffective procedure for removing
all but the most blatantly biased venirepersons. 63
In contrast, the peremptory challenge is, by definition, a chal-
lenge that requires no explanation." It allows a party to strike a
juror from the venire for any reason whatsoever. 65 By tradition, the
use of peremptory strikes is only limited by those court rules and
statutes authorizing the number of peremptories available to both
sides. 66 The peremptory challenge is, therefore, a tool that allows
the parties in a trial to have a measure of control in composing thejury. 67
Historically, commentators have viewed the peremptory chal-
lenge as a criminal defendant's device. 69 Blackstone, for example,
considered the strike the means by which a defendant could remove
from the jury a person who harbored bad feelings toward the
accused. 69 He noted two additional purposes for the peremptory
challenge: to allow the removal of jurors whom the accused intui-
59 Id. at 339 n.13. Such an examination may put counsel in an awkward position, espe-
cially if the judge refuses to ask questions designed to elicit bias. See VAN DYKE, supra note
54, at 145. Most states also have statutes that establish "cause" for the for cause challenge.
Id. at 143; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-150 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. 15-12-164 (Michie 1990).
6°
 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) ("Illhe bare questioning (a juror's)
indifference may sometime provoke a resentment. — (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146
U.S. 370, 376 (1892))).
61 Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 54, at 340.
62 Id. at 340. Although for cause challenges are unlimited in number, few are made and
even fewer accepted. Simon & Marshall, supra note 49, at 216.
65 See Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Ray. 235, 243-44
(1968); see also Simon & Marshall, supra note 49, at 216.
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 54, at 340.
65 VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 145.
" O'Connell, supra note 2, at 436. Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes 20 peremptory strikes for each side in a capital trial, 10 peremptory strikes for
the defendant and six for the government involved in a felony offense trial, and three for
each side involved in a misdemeanor offense trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
67 See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 54, at 341.
" See, e.g., id.; VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 147.
69 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
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tively disliked, so that the defendant would have "a good opinion
of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him," and to
allow removal of those prospective jurors the defendant may have
alienated during voir dire."
Colonial America adopted England's grant of peremptory chal-
lenges for criminal defendants." When the United States first au-
thorized use of the peremptory challenge in the late 1700s, the
authorizing statute did not include prosecutors." Congress initially
allotted the defendant thirty-five peremptories in trials for treason,
and twenty in capital felony trials." Federal prosecutors were not
statutorily authorized to use peremptory strikes until 1865: five
where the defendant was entitled to twenty, and two where the
defendant received ten. 74 Similarly, most state prosecutors did not
receive the right to employ peremptories until the mid-nineteenth
century." Today, although every state now authorizes some kind of
pererriptory juror exclusion for civil as well as criminal trials, the
states generally allot significantly more challenges for criminal
cases. 76
" See id.
71 VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 147, 148.
72 VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 147 (citing Act of March 1, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119
(1790) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 424 (1988) (challenges)); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 214 & n.13 (1965). In Swain, Justice White noted that a common law right to use
peremptory challenges was presumed to exist for federal prosecutors, perhaps originating
in the English common law right to "stand jurors aside." Swain, 380 U.S. at 214; see also VAN
DYKE, supra note 54, at 148 (explanation of the doctrine of "standing jurors aside"). This
prosecution practice was not well accepted by the states, however, and prosecutorial peremp-
tory strikes were limited. VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 148-49.
" See Swain, 380 U.S. at 214 (citing § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790)). The statute states:
that if any person or persons be indicted of treason against the United States,
and shall stand mute or refuse to plead, or shall challenge peremptorily above
the number of thirty-five of the jury; or if any person or persons be indicted
of any other of the offenses herein before set Forth, for which the punishment
is declared to he death, if he or they shall also stand mute or will not answer to
the indictment, or challenge peremptorily above the number of twenty persons
of the jury; the court, in any of the cases aforesaid, shall notwithstanding
proceed to the trial of the person or persons so standing mute or challenging,
as if he or they had pleaded not guilty, and render judgment thereon accord-
ingly.
§ 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790).
74 Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-15 (citing Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500
(1865)).
76 VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 148-49. in fact, neither New York nor Virginia authorized
prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges until the late nineteenth century. Id.
76 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 217; see also, e.g., CAL, CIV. PROC. CODE § 231 (West Supp. 1991)
(20 challenges per party in capital cases, 10 challenges in other felony cases, six challenges
in civil cases).
Historically, criminal defendants were allotted more challenges than the prosecution. See
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B. Batson v. Kentucky: The Fourteenth Amendment Protects Criminal
Defendants from Prosecutors' Race-Based Strikes
Although the peremptory challenge is an important safeguard
of defendant rights,77
 courts have recognized that parties may use
challenges as a means to achieve less noble ends. 78
 In the 1880 case
of Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the system-
atic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury pool that supplies
the venire violates the equal protection rights of African-American
defendants. 79 In Strauder, the defendant, an ex-slave, objected to a
West Virginia statute that expressly prohibited African-Americans
from being called for jury service. 80 The Court reasoned that be-
cause the statute secured a white man's right to a jury selected from
members of his race, and denied that same right to African-Amer-
ican men, African-Americans were denied equal protection of the
laws. 8 ' Thus, the Court established that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires race-neutral jury service selection procedures. 82
 As one
commentator noted, after Strauder, prosecutors desiring all-white
juries employed discriminatory peremptory strikes as an alternative
to segregated jury lists." This commentator suggested that prose-
cutors desired to exclude African-Americans from jury service ex-
VAN DYKE, supra note 54, at 149. There has recently been movement, however, toward
equalizing the number of peremptory challenges granted each side in a criminal trial, as
recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (off. cmt. 1988). For examples of this trend in non-capital felony
cases, see CAL, Cm. ['Roc. CODE § 231 (West Supp. 1991) (state and defendant allotted 10
peremptory challenges); Cow. Rev. STAT. § 16-10-104 (1986) (state and defendant allotted
five peremptory challenges); D.C. CODE ANN. 23-105 (1989) (state and defendant allotted
10 peremptory challenges); HAW. REV. STAT. § 635-30 (1985) (state and defendant allotted
three peremptory challenges); IDAHO CODE § 19-2016 (1987) (state and defendant allotted
six peremptory challenges); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3412 (1988) (state allotted same number
of peremptory challenges as all defendants); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-17-3 (1972) (state and
defendant allotted six peremptory challenges); Mo. Rev. STAT. § 494.480 (Supp. 1992) (same).
But see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-305 (Michie 1987) (state entitled to six peremptory
challenges, defendant entitled to eight); N.J. Rev. STAT. § 2A:78-7 (Supp. 1991) (state entitled
to 12 peremptory challenges, defendant to 20); S.C. CODE ANN. 14-7-1110 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1990) (state entitled to no more than live peremptory challenges, defendant to no
more than 10).
" See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical purpose
of peremptory challenges.
78
 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986); see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 235-36 (Gold-
berg, J., dissenting).
78 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
" Id. at 304, 309.
81 Id. at 308.
82 See id. at 310-11.
83 Swain, 380 U.S. at '134-36 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Zirlin, supra note 26, at 230.
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cept in those cases where both the crime victim and the accused
were African-American."
This abuse of the peremptory system avoided serious judicial
inquiry until the 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama. 85 In Swain, the
United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's use of per-
emptory challenges to eliminate African-American jurors from the
jury venire in any particular trial does not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court reasoned
that a defendant is denied equal protection of the laws only when
prosecutors systematically use peremptory challenges to keep Af-
rican-Americans from participating in the jury system. 87
 The Court
also noted that careful scrutiny would pervert the peremptory sys-
tem's historical purpose. 88
In Swain, Robert Swain, an African-American, was charged and
convicted of rape and sentenced to death.'" At Swain's trial, the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove six of the eight
African-American members of the venire."° The other two African-
Americans were exempted."' Swain, invoking Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, motioned the court to quash the indictment, strike the venire
and discharge the petit jury." 2 To support his claim, Swain offered
evidence that although African-American males accounted for
twenty-six percent of the eligible juror population, African-Ameri-
cans represented only ten to fifteen percent of grand and petit jury
venires." Moreover, Swain asserted that no African-American had
served on a petit jury in approximately fifteen years." The trial
court dismissed Swain's motion, and the Alabama Supreme Court
later affirmed his conviction." The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari."
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice White,
affirmed the Alabama Supreme Court decision."' The Court noted
a° See Swain, 380 U.S. at 236 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Zirlin, supra note 26, at 230.
85 See Batson v, Kentucky, 976 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Zirlin, supra note 26, at 230.
'4' 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965).
" Id. at 223-24.
88 Id. at 222.
89 Id. at 203-04.
99 /d. at 205.
9L Id.
92 Id. at 203,
05
 Id. at 205.
9, ld.
95 Id. at 203.
95 Id.
97 Id. at 203, 228.
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that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause when it purposely
excludes African-Americans from juries." The Court also noted,
however, that defendants could not prove purposeful discrimina-
tion merely by showing that African-Americans were underrepre-
sented on their particular jury. 99 The Court noted that "[i]n light
of the purposes of the peremptory system and the function it serves
in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury
trial," it could not subject the peremptory challenge to the tradi-
tional standards of equal protection without turning the peremptory
challenge into a challenge for cause.'"
The Court asserted that the defendant must prove a pervasive
pattern of discriminatory strikes in order to prove an equal protec-
tion violation." In this case, although no African-American had
served on any petit jury in a decade and a half, the Court refused
to find a pervasive pattern.' 02 The Court was unwilling to accept
the Swain defendant's proof because the record was unclear as to
which side had struck the prospective jurors.'"
Furthermore, the Court stated that a prosecutor is presumed
to have employed strikes to secure an impartial jury.'" The Court
explained that, traditionally, parties have relied on peremptory chal-
lenges to secure a fair jury.'" The Court noted that while the
challenge for cause only allows for removal of jurors "on a narrowly
specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality," the
peremptory challenge allows removal of jurors that a party suspects,
but cannot prove, are partial.'"6 As a result, the Court continued,
parties must draw upon their limited knowledge of the juror, in-
cluding group affiliation, to determine if a juror may be partial and
thereby undermine the fairness of the tria1.]° 7 Thus, the Court
established that a defendant would need to prove that African-
Americans were consistently and systematically denied a place on
'38 Id. at 203-04.
99 Id. at 208-09.
m/d. at 221-22.
151 /d. at 223.
l'12 /d. at 205,224.
1"3 Id. at 226.
"s' Id. at 222.
Id. at 211-12. The Court presented a lengthy discussion of the history and purpose
of the peremptory challenge. Id. at 212-19.
ma Id. at 220.
107 Id. at 221. The Court noted that the question that a prosecutor ... must decide is
not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial but whether one from




the jury solely on account of race to raise a successful equal protec-
tion challenge. 108
As one commentator noted, the Swain holding placed an "un-
justifiable and virtually insuperable burden upon injured defen-
dants." 10° Consequently, courts and commentators strongly criti-
cized the decision as offering little recourse to injured defendants."°
In addition, a significant number of state courts rejected the Swain
decision by utilizing their state constitutions' version of the Sixth
Amendment.'" The Second and Sixth Circuits similarly circum-
vented the Swain decision. 12
 Following these decisions, defendants
brought cases in other states and other circuits in the hope of
obtaining a similarly hostile response to Swain." 3
 One of these cases,
Batson v. Kentucky, rose to the Supreme Court." 4
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits the State's use of discriminatory strikes
"'" See id. at 223-24.
109
 Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-
White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1 163 (1966). See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 54, at 345
n.42, for a list of cases where defendants failed to meet the Swain test.
I'D See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 767-68 (Cal. 1978); Commonwealth v. Soares,
387 N.E.2d 499, 510 n.11 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); Sherri L. Johnson, Black
Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Micn. L. REV. 1611, 1658, 1659 & n.242 (1985); Kuhn, supra
note 63, at 289-96 (1968); Gary L. Geeslin, Note, Peremptory Challenge—Systematic Exclusion
of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss, L.J. 157, 162 (1967); Comment, supra note
109, at 1159. Despite criticism of the Swain decision, the use of peremptory challenges was
considered so intertwined with the concept of a fair trial that substantive change was unex-
pected. See Eric L. Chase, Peremptory Challenges, in 8 THE GuIDE To AMERICAN LAW 175, 177
(1984). As Eric Chase noted, "the practice [of peremptory challenges] is deeply rooted in the
Anglo-American concept of a 'fair trial.' Reform of the peremptory challenge will probably
be limited to procedural change.. . . The substance ... seems secure... ."
111 See Zirlin, supra note 26, at 231-36, for a more complete discussion. The following
courts employed their state's version of the Sixth Amendment to prohibit discriminatory
strikes: People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 767-68 (Cal. 1978); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997,
1012 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 485-86
(Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 514-15 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
881, (1979). But see State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (Swain v.
Alabama controls where only one minority juror is peremptorily struck).
112 See Booker v, Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S. 1001, reinstated sub nom. Booker v. jabe, 801 F.2d 871, 872 (6th
Cir, 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d
Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). These courts used the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair cross section to circumvent Swain by reasoning that Swain was decided
before the Sixth Amendment was applied to the states. See Zirlin, supra note 26, at 233.
11 s Zirlin, supra note 26, at 233. Zirlin notes that twenty-nine states considered the issue
before Batson v. Kentucky was decided, Id.; see also Gilliard v. Mississippi, 476 U.S. 867, 871
n.3 (1982) (Marshall, j., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (list of cases); United States v.
Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 551 n.16 (5th Cir. 1986) (cases decided after (Allard).
"4 Zirlin, supra note 26, at 234.
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in any individual trial." 6 The Court reasoned that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not strike
members of the defendant's race on account of race or on the
assumption that members of the racial group in question are not
qualified for jury service." 6 Batson, an African-American man, had
been indicted on charges of burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 17
At trial, the prosecutor used four peremptory strikes to remove all
prospective African-American jurors from the venire." 8 In re-
sponse, Batson requested that the jury be discharged." Batson
asserted that the prosecutor's challenges violated both his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury drawn from a cross section of the
community and his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights.' 20 The trial court, denying Batson's motion, asserted that
parties can "strike anybody they want to." 12 ' Batson appealed to the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. 122 The Supreme Court of Kentucky,
relying on Swain, affirmed the trial court decision and held that a
defendant must show systematic exclusion in order to assert denial
of a jury drawn from a fair cross section.'"
Batson rose to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Powell, reexamined Swain's in-
terpretation of the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to
the use of peremptory challenges.' 24 The Court held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor's use of race-based per-
emptory challenges. 125 Moreover, the Court held that a defendant
does not have to prove systematic exclusion in order to object to
prosecution strikes. 126
The Batson Court reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause
governs peremptory challenges because the Fourteenth Amend-
" Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
" Id. at 85-86.
112 1d. at 82.




122 1d. at 83. Batson, conceding that Swain a. Alabama foreclosed an equal protection
argument in any individual case, instead focused on the Sixth Amendment fair cross section
argument that had been successful in People v. Wheeler and Commonwealth v. Soares. Id. at 83.
Batson also raised an equal protection violation under the Swain "pattern" of discrimination
test. Id. at 83-84.
123 1d. at 84.
124 476 U.S. at 84 n.4. The Court never considered Batson's Sixth Amendment challenge.
Id.
125 Id. at 89.
126 See id. at 87-88.
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ment protects individuals during all phases of the trial process.'"
When prosecutors use peremptory strikes in a discriminatory man-
ner, the Court continued, equal protection problems arise.' 28 Ac-
cording to the Court, when members of a defendant's race are
barred from jury service as a group, the defendant's ability to
receive a fair trial is diminished. 12" In addition, the Court noted
that discriminatory strikes violate Strauder v. West Virginia's specific
prohibition against barring persons from jury service solely on ac-
count of race."'"
The Batson Court emphasized that the Swain pervasive pattern
analysis was unsuccessful in upholding defendants' equal protection
rights. 13 ' Because defendants were unable to satisfy the burden of
proof needed to establish a pervasive pattern of discrimination,
peremptory strikes became immune from constitutional scrutiny.'"
The Court therefore adopted an individual trial analysis, declaring
the Swain standard an inadequate evidentiary formulation of a
prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Protection ,
Clause.' 33
The Batson Court's decision was specifically addressed to defen-
dants who are members of a cognizable group and who object to
the exclusion of prospective jurors of shared group identity.'" Only
in this situation, implied the Court, does the defendant have stand-
ing to raise the equal protection claim. 135
 The Batson Court also
noted general disfavor toward the use of discriminatory strikes in
any proceeding.m The Court explained that discriminatory strikes
harm not only the defendant but also the excluded juror and the
community at large.'"
122 Id. at 88-89.
128 See id. at 85-90.
128 See id. at 86-87.
188 Id. at 85-86 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880)).
SiI Id. at 92-93.
" 2 Id.
188 Id. at 93-94.
188 Id. at 94.
188 Id. at 94, 96. En his concurrence, Justice White noted his approval of the narrow
holding. Id. at 101. He suggested it was an appropriate response to Swain, because despite
Swain, there remained a widespread practice of prosecutors using peremptories to strike
African-American venirepersons when the defendant was also African-American. Id.
186 See id. at 87.
182 Id. Batson has been interpreted as holding only that discriminatory strikes deny equal
protection to defendants who share a racial identity with the excluded juror. See Powers v.
Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1376 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Batson has also been
read as asserting, in dicta, that peremptory strikes also violate the equal protection rights of
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The Batson Court asserted that its decision created a manage-
able means for the defendant to make a prima facie showing of
discriminatory behavior that violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 38 Following Batson, a defendant member of a cognizable
group who questions the prosecutor's motive for excluding racially
similar prospective jurors must only show the court that the pros-
ecutor used peremptory challenges to strike the members of the
same group from jury service at the trial in question.'" This show-
ing suffices to create an inference of impermissible exclusion.m
The defendant is, therefore, not required to offer proof of broader
state activities indicating systematic exclusion for purposes of se-
curing segregated juries."' Once the defendant has made a showing
of unlawful discrimination, the prosecutor must then provide race-
neutral explanations for the strikes.' 42
The Court expressly declined to consider whether the Batson
reasoning applied to a criminal defendant's use of peremptory
strikes.' 43 Justice Marshall, in his concurrence, noted the potential
tension between protecting the role of the peremptory as a safe-
guard of fair jury trials and freeing the courtroom from racial
the excluded juror. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 2, at 444 ("The Batson Court further stated
that the practice also denied the equal rights of the prospective jurors, because it implied
that they, because of their race, were either unqualified to serve as jurors in general, or were
unable to decide impartially a case involving a member of their own race.").
138 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
199 1d. at 96.
14° Id.
141 Id. at 92-93, 100 n.25.
72 Id. at 96-97.
143 Id. at 89 n.12. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger asserted that it would be unfair
not to apply the Batson rule to the defense as well as to the prosecution. Id. at 126 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Burger asserted that the criminal justice system requires freedom
from bias against the prosecution as well as the defendant. Id. (quoting Hayes v. Missouri,
120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). But see Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 823-25 (courts are mistaken in
reading Hayes as supporting rights for the prosecution). Some of the pre-Batson courts that
limited the use of peremptories shared Justice Burger's opinion and used the Sixth Amend-
ment or their state equivalent to limit the use of peremptory challenges by the defense as
well as the prosecution. See Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S. 1001, reinstated sub nom. Booker v. Jabe, 801
F.2d 871, 872 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d
1113, 1118 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); People v. Wheeler,
583 P.2d 748, 768 (Cal. 1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 485-86 (Fla. 1984); Common-
wealth v. Soares, 387 N.E,2d 499, 514-15 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). But see
United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1986) (declining to consider reasons
other than Fourteenth Amendment for limiting strikes in part to avoid inhibiting defense
use of peremptory strikes); United States v, Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984) (same);
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 250 n.8 (2d Cir, 1977) (same).
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bias.'" Commentators have disagreed about whether the Court
should strive to protect the criminal defendant's right to shape the
jury or to eliminate all forms of discrimination in the courtroom.'"
Commentators on both sides, however, have agreed that obstacles
exist that prevent the application of the Batson reasoning to the
defendant's use of peremptory challenges.' 46 These commentators
have noted that in order to apply the Batson reasoning to criminal
defendants, the prosecution must have standing to object to the
defendant's use of challenges"' and the defendant must be consid-
ered a state actor.'"
II. STANDING
The Batson Court prohibited the State's use of discriminatory
strikes in order to secure the equal protection rights of criminal
defendants. 149 The State, on the other hand, has no such equal
protection rights and consequently no standing to assert a violation
of equal protection rights claim."° In order for the State to establish
an equal protection claim, therefore, the State would have to assert
the rights of a third party—the excluded juror.' 5 '
A number of states interpreted their constitutions' equivalent
to the Sixth Amendment to allow defendants to object to discrimi-
natory strikes.' 52 In Holland v. Illinois, the United States Supreme
144 Batson, 476 U.S. at 107-08 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall made his position
clear:
Much ink has been spilled regarding the historic importance of defendants'
peremptory challenges. . . But this Court has also repeatedly stated that the
right of peremptory challenge is not of constitutional magnitude, and may be
withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of impartial
jury and fair trial. The potential for racial prejudice, further, inheres in the
defendant's challenge as well. If the prosecutor's peremptory challenge could
be eliminated only at the cost of eliminating the defendant's challenge as well,
do not think that would be too great a price to pay.
Id. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
145 Compare Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 811 (differences between prosecution and
defense are so significant that Batson should not be extended) with Alschuler, supra note 27,
at 197 (courts should not hesitate to hold that discrimination by defense attorneys violates
equal protection) and E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory
Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky, 88 CoLum. L. REV. 355, 355 (1988) (same).
See Alschuler, supra note 27, at 198; Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 811.
Alschuler, supra note 27, at 198; Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 820 n.74.
145 See Alschuler, supra note 27, at 197; Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 811-12.
1 " See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
15B Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 820 n.74.
151 1d.
L52 See infra notes 360-74 and accompanying text.
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Court rejected this approach.' 53 Instead, in Powers v. Ohio, the Court
determined that discriminatory strikes violate the equal protection
rights of the excluded juror and that a defendant has third-party
standing to assert the juror's claim.'"
A. Holland v. Illinois: Dismissing the Sixth Amendment Approach' 55
The Supreme Court has employed the fair cross section re-
quirement of the Sixth Amendment to limit discrimination in jury
selection proceedings.'" The Sixth Amendment specifically ensures
the right of the accused to be tried by an impartial jury.'" At least
one Justice argued that the Court could use the Sixth Amendment
to achieve a Batson-like result in cases where the defendant and the
excluded juror do not share a racial identity because the amend-
ment has no requirement of shared group identity.' 58 The Court,
however, determined that the Sixth Amendment plays no role in
regulating the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes.' 59
In the 1990 case of Holland v. Illinois, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit the pros-
ecution from engaging in face-based juror challenges.'" Defendant
Holland asserted that the use of peremptory strikes denied him his
constitutionally guaranteed trial by a fair cross section of the corn-
munity. 16 ' Although the Court recognized that Holland had stand-
ing to assert the challenge, the Cotirt held that the fair cross section
requirement does not apply to the actual composition of the petit
jury.' 62
153 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990).
154
 1 1 1 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991).
"5 See supra note 42 for the text of the Sixth Amendment.
156 See, e.g., Duren•v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979) (fair cross section requirement
applies to venire selection); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975) (fair cross section
requirement applies to jury pool selection).
' 57 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
155 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 341-42 (1989) (plurality opinion). According to justice
Brennan, the only significant difference in outcome between applying the Sixth Amendment
instead of the Fourteenth Amendment is that the Sixth Amendment "would bar the prose-
cution from excluding venirepersons from the petit jury on account of their membership in
some cognizable group, whereas the Equal Protection Clause might not provide a basis of
relief unless the defendant belonged to the group whose members were improperly ex-
cluded." Id.
159 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990).
169 1d.
161 1d. at 476.
162 1d. at 477-78.
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In Holland, the Court reaffirmed that the State cannot manip-
ulate the venire, reasoning that, the defendant is entitled to a jury
pool drawn from the entire community.'" The Court noted that
the Sixth Amendment ensures that each party begins the jury se-
lection process without special advantage.' 64 The initial represen-
tative nature of the venire, asserted the Court, may be changed by
either State or defense challenges.' 65 According to the Court, the
purpose of the peremptory strike is to remove persons believed
partial to the other side.' 66 Thus, the Court held, the Sixth Amend-
ment requirement of a representative cross section reaches only the
pool from which the venire is drawn and not to any particular
challenge.' 67
The Holland Court intimated that the propriety of prosecutorial
use of racially motivated strikes, regardless of the race of the de-
fendant, is essentially a Fourteenth Amendment issue. 16 ' Justice
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, noted that the prosecutor's race-
based challenges may have violated the Batson rule, but not the
Sixth Amendment.'" As a result, commentators expressed their
belief that the Court's decision in Holland suggested that the moti-
vations underlying Batson had diminished.'"
According to one commentator, "the Court's lofty rhetoric ap-
pears to have made the peremptory challenge sacrosanct as the
means of assuring a fair trial. . . ." 17 I This same commentator
asserted that "[b]y straying from its previous path of demanding
non-discriminatory jury selection, the Court halted its progress to-
ward an end to racial discrimination in jury selection."'" The Court,
however, had only begun its reconsideration of the use of peremp-
tory challenges.'"
563 See id. at 480.
1 " Id. at 481.
555 Id. at 480.	 •
"Id. at 483.
157 See id. at 477-78.
163 Id. at 487 & n.3.
139
	
at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Robert L. Harris, Jr., Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptory Challenges, 32 WM. Sc
MARY L. REv. 1027, 1034 (1991); The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129,
173 (1990). But see Steven W. Fisher, Racial Discrimination in jury Selection: A 'Batson' Update,
N,Y. L.J., July 17, 1990, at Al (suggesting the Court would move to limit the use of
discriminatory strikes).
171 Harris, supra note 170, at 1032.
572 Id. at 1034.
173 During 1991 the Court considered three major peremptory challenge cases, and
certified a fourth: Powers v. Ohio, 11 I S. Ct. 1364 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville, 111 S. Ct.
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B. Powers v. Ohio: Establishing Standing Regardless of Race
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
In the 1991 case of Powers v. Ohio, the United States Supreme
Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause, a criminal de-
fendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors by peremptory
strike, even if the defendant and the excluded jurors do not share
a racial identity. 14 In reaching this conclusion, the Court deter-
mined that the prospective juror has a constitutional right not to
be excluded from a jury on account of race and that a criminal
defendant has standing to raise the equal protection claims of ex-
cluded jurors."' The Powers decision reaffirmed the Court's interest
in prohibiting racially motivated peremptory strikes. 176
In Powers, Larry Joe Powers, a white man, was charged with
two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted ag-
gravated murder, to which he pleaded not guilty.' 77 During the jury
selection process, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged an Afri-
can-American panelist.' 78 Citing the Batson decision, Powers mo-
tioned the court to require the prosecution to put forth a race-
neutral basis for its peremptory challenge.' 79 The court denied
Powers's motion and the juror was excused.' 8° The State continued
to use peremptory challenges to strike African-American venire-
persons. 18 ' After each strike, Powers renewed his objection and was
overruled. 182 Powers was convicted on all counts and sentenced to
fifty-three years to life in prison.'"
2077 (1991); Hernandez v. New York, 111  S. Ct. 1859 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.
Ct. 370 (1991).
'" Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
' 75 Id, at 1370, 1373.
176
 See id. at 1366.
177 id. Defendant Powers had gone to the home of Gary Goldman after spending the
evening in a bar with Goldman and another man, Thomas Kikas. State v. Powers, No. 87AP-
526, 1988 WL 134822, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1988). At Mr. Goldman's home, Powers
placed a gun on a bar stool in the Goldman basement, left the room, and returned to shoot
and kill Goldman and Kikas, and to attempt to shoot Charlotte Goldman, Goldman's wife.
Id. at *1, *3, The trial testimony suggested that Powers was acting as a hit man for Brad
Wellman, who was aware that Goldman was having an affair with Wellman's wife. Id. at *3.
'" Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1366.
' 79 Id. The record does not indicate why Powers objected to the strikes. Id.
186 Id. The Court's refusal to request race-neutral explanations was one of eight assign-
ments of error raised on appeal. 1988 WL 134822, at *1.
IS ' Powers, 1 1 1 S. Ct. at 1366. The State exercised a total of' 10 challenges and removed
seven black panelists. Id. The record provides no indication that race was a factor in the
commission of Powers' crimes. Id. The victims were white, as was Powers. Powers, 1988 WL
134822, at *5.
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Powers appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, claiming that
the prosecutor's use of discriminatory strikes violated the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.' 84 The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected
Powers's assignment of error, holding that the defendant failed to
satisfy the first test of Batson—a showing that the prosecutor used
peremptory strikes to remove members of the defendant's race
from the venire.'" After the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed
Powers's appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certior-
ari. 186
I84 Powers, 1988 WL 134822, at * 1. Powers relied on Batson to support his argument that
the prosecution's actions violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at *5. Powers, relying on Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972),
also argued that the strikes violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See
id. at *5, *6.
In Peters, a 1972 case, the United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that
a state is prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from subjecting
a defendant to trial by a jury that had been selected in a discriminatory manner. 407 U.S. at
505. In upholding Peters's due process claim, the Court reasoned that excluding any iden-
tifiable class of citizens from jury service has the potential to impact every defendant's trial
in a subtle but pervasive manner. Id. at 503. Thus, the Peters Court established that any
defendant, regardless of race or group affiliation, has standing to attack the State's illegal
exclusion of blacks from jury service by means of discriminatory selection procedures. Id. at
504. Three dissenting Justices rejected the idea that non-minority defendants could be denied
due process. Id. at 511 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
To support his Sixth Amendment argument, Powers relied on the 1974 case of Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Powers, 1988 WL 134822, at *7. In Taylor, the United
States Supreme Court held that a male defendant has standing to object to the State's use of
discriminatory statutory jury selection schemes to exclude women from his jury as violative
of the Sixth Amendment. 419 U.S. at 526. The defendant was not a member of the excluded
class, but argued that Louisiana's requirement, that women who wished to serve on a jury
notify a state official in writing of their desire, violated his right to a jury drawn from a
venire constituting a fair cross section of the community. Id. The Court reasoned that a jury
selection scheme, such as Louisiana's, which resulted in the systematic exclusion of women
(who represented 53% of the Louisiana citizenry) from jury service resulted in the lack of a
fair cross section from which to draw a jury. Id. at 531. The Court also established that Taylor
had the ability to present his claim even though he was not a member of the excluded class.
Id. at 526. The Court did not consider Powers's Sixth Amendment claim. Powers, 111 S. Ct.
at 1367.
In addition to his claims based on the United States Constitution, Powers asserted claims
based on Article 1, Sections Ten and Sixteen of the Ohio Constitution. Powers, 1988 WL
134822, at *1. Powers did not raise the claims under the state constitution in his appeal to
the Supreme Court. See id. at 1367.
185 1988 WL 134822, at *9. The court noted that even if the reasoning in Kiff and Taylor
supported Powers's Fourteenth Amendment claim, this shared racial identity requirement
would prohibit an expansion of the Batson rule to help Powers. Id. at *5.
"6 Powers, 1 1 1 S. Ct. at 1367. After the trial conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Court
of Appeals, Powers appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Id. at 1366-67. That court
dismissed the appeal for lack of a valid constitutional question. Id. Powers petitioned to the
United States Supreme Court for review on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and
Sixth Amendment fair cross section grounds. Id. at 1367. The Court decided Holland a.
Illinois, holding the Sixth Amendment does not limit peremptory challenges, while Powers's
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In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the appellate court decision.' 87 The
Court determined that Powers's race was irrelevant to his right to
object to the prosecution's peremptory challenges. 188 The Court
held that race-based peremptory strikes violate the challenged ju-
ror's equal protection rights and that the defendant in a criminal
case can raise the claim for the excluded juror. 189 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court considered two threshold issues: first, whether
discriminatory strikes deprive the excluded juror of equal protec-
tion of the law, and second, whether a criminal defendant has
standing to object for the excluded juror. 19°
The Powers Court began its analysis by considering the effect
of the discriminatory challenge on the excused juror. 19 ' The Court
stated that although Batson examined the harm caused to the de-
fendant when members of the defendant's race were excluded from
jury service, the purpose of Batson was not merely to protect the
defendant. 192 Batson, according to the Powers Court, recognized that
the discriminatory strike harmed the excluded juror and the com-
munity and "was designed to serve multiple ends."'"
The Powers Court then discussed the harm caused to the ex-
cluded juror who is removed from the venire by a discriminatory
strike.'" The Court identified three reasons why the opportunity
to serve on a jury is important to ordinary citizens.'" First, accord-
ing to the Court, a main reason for sustaining a jury system is to
provide an opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the
criminal justice system.' 96 Second, the Court noted that participation
in jury service helps ensure that laws remain democratic, because
citizens are instrumental in guarding individual rights and also
because citizens who assist in applying the laws are better able to
accept the laws.' 97 Finally, jury service allows people to experience
petition was pending. Id. The Court then granted Powers's petition for certiorari solely on
the equal protection grounds. Id.
L97 Id.
199 See id,
189 Id. at 1370, 1373.
199 See id. at 1368.
191 Id, at 1368.
192 Id, (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986)).
193
 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1368 (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 225, 259 (1986)); see also
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 'U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
Powers, Ill S. Ct. at 1368.
19' Id at 1368-69.
196 /d. at 1368.
07 /d, at 1369 (citing Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 215 (1958) (Black, J. dis-
senting)).
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the workings of government and, as a result, to perhaps better
respect the law.I 98
The Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause protects
a citizen's right to participate in the jury system from being disposed
of for racially motivated reasons.'" The Court reasoned that racial
discrimination in jury selection proceedings thus violates the E qual
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" As support for
its conclusion, the Court cited the strong statutory policy against
discrimination in the jury selection process of the Civil Rights Act
of 1875. 201 The Court further noted that although a state may
provide statutory qualifications for citizens to serve as jurors, the
state may exclude no person solely on account of race.202 Finally,
the Court pointed out that in a due process challenge to racial
discrimination in the formation of grand and petit juries, it had
permitted a white defendant to challenge racial discrimination
against African-American jurors in the selection of grand and petit
juries.2" The Court suggested that in that case six Justices deter-
mined that the defendant's race had no relevance to standing be-
cause of their belief that racial discrimination cannot be allowed in
the courtroom. 204
The Powers Court next considered whether a white criminal
defendant could challenge the racially motivated strike in any par-
108 ./d. at 1369 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
'00 Id. at 1370.
200 Id. at 1369-70.
201 Id. at 1369. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988), which
states:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by
law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude; and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty
in the selection or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen
for such cause, shall be fined not inure than $5,000.
18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988).
202 Id. at 1369 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); Carter v. jury Conitn'n
of Green County, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965);
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1946); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
386 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
2" Powers, ill S. Ct. at 1369 (citing Peters v. Kill; 407 U.S. 493, 507 (1972)); see also
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. at 506-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). The Ohio appellate
court considered the Peters decision, which had no majority, "somewhat confused" and not
helpful in determining whether a white defendant could object to discriminatory strikes of
black prospective jurors. State v. Powers, No. 87AP-526, 1988 WL 134822, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 13, 1988).
201 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1369.
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ticular jury tria1. 2°8 The Court observed that litigants generally must
assert only their own interests, rather than claims to relief based
upon an injury to a third party.206 The Court also noted, however,
that litigants are allowed to bring an action based on the rights of
a third party when three criteria are satisfied. 207
The Court reviewed the three-part test that litigants must sat-
isfy to bring an action on behalf of a third party. 208 First, the litigant
must suffer an "injury-in-fact," such that the litigant has a "sufficient
concrete interest" in the outcome of the controversy. 2°9
 Second, the
litigant must be closely related to the party whose rights the litigant
wishes to assert. 2 t 0
 Finally, obstacles must prevent the third party
from asserting his or her own claim. 2 " The Court has allowed
criminal defendants to challenge their convictions by raising the
rights of third parties when all three criteria are met. 212
 The Court
determined that defendants such as Powers satisfied all three cri-
teria. 213
The Powers Court asserted that when a prosecutor behaves in
a racially discriminatory manner at the defendant's trial, the defen-
dant suffers an "injury-in-fact" creating sufficient interest in the
outcome to satisfy the first iest. 2 " As support for its conclusion, the
Court asserted that the harm occurs because the discriminatory use
of strikes "'casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.'"215
The Court stated that the purpose of the jury system is to make




2°9 Id.; see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1976) (doctor suffered "injury-in-
fact" from statute that limited medicaid payments provided to indigent women seeking
abortions).
210 Powers, Ill S. Ct. at 1370; see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115 (doctor had a "sufficiently
close relationship" with patient seeking abortion).
211 Id. at 1370-71; see also Singleton, 928 U.S. at 117 (women seeking abortion faced
"hindrance" because privacy may be desired and pregnancy may come to term).
212 Id. at 1371. The Court cites several cases supporting this proposition. Id.; see also, e.g.,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972) (birth control advocate allowed to assert
rights of unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (doctor and
birth control advocate allowed to assert rights of married couple).
215 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
2" Id. at 1372. The Court stated that a criminal defendant suffers a cognizable injury
when the prosecutor employs discriminatory strikes, and, therefore, has a concrete interest
in objecting to discriminatory challenges. Id. at 1371 (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255,
259 (1986)). The Court asserted that the discriminatory strikes cause the defendant's injury
by undermining the integrity of the judicial process, not by dismissing jurors who might have
favored the defendant. Id. (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 493 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
215 Id. at 1371 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
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certain that both the defendant and the community believe a fair
trial is performed in accordance with the law. 2 ' 6 Thus, the jury
guards against wrongful use of power by the state. 217 When a pros-
ecutor, acting for the state, wrongfully and discriminatorily excludes
jurors, the perception of a check on the state's power is diminished
because a constitutional violation is committed in open court. 21 s
The Powers Court next asserted that the relationship between
the defendant and the excluded juror is as close, and perhaps closer,
than others recognized as satisfying the second criteria for estab-
lishing third-party standing.219 The Court observed that the party
and the juror establish a relationship during voir dire. 22°
The Court also noted that, like the defendant, the excluded
juror has an interest in keeping racial discrimination from the court-
room, because the rejected juror may suffer humiliation and loss
of confidence in the system.22 ' Finally, the Court suggested that the
defendant would adequately represent the rights of the excluded
juror because proof of discrimination in the jury selection may lead
to a reversal of the conviction. 222 Thus, the Court concluded the
defendant would be an effective advocate for the excluded juror. 223
Finally, the Powers Court reasoned that the third criteria,
whether a third party lacks adequate ability to assert his or her own
rights, is satisfied because a dismissed juror has little incentive to
vindicate the violated right. 224 According to the Court, excluded
jurors have a difficult time collecting proof of the discrimination. 225
The Court noted that jurors are far more likely to just leave the
courtroom than engage in the arduous tasks needed to vindicate
their rights.22" The Court therefore concluded that a defendant in
a criminal case can raise the equal protection claims of jurors ex-
cluded by the prosecution because of their race. 227
'" Id. at 1372.
217 1d. at 1371.
218 Id.
219 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372. The Court noted, as an example, that a beer vendor was
found to have a "satisfactory relationship" to assert the equal protection claims of customers
prohibited from purchasing alcohol. Id.
220 Id. Justice Kennedy's choice of the word party and nut criminal defendant arguably




224 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
225 Id.
222 Id .
227 Id. in so concluding, the Court noted that it was declining "to reverse a course of
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia contended that the ma-
jority opinion was a direct departure from existing precedent, which
required a shared racial identity between the defendant and the
excluded juror for a race-based peremptory strike to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. 228 Justice Scalia argued that, traditionally,
defendants have been limited to raising equal protection claims
based on violations of their own rights, and that even with third-
party standing, jurors do not suffer any injury for defendants to
assert. 229 He first noted that in every case where the Court invali-
dated a criminal conviction on equal protection grounds, the Court
based its decision on an injury to the defendant caused by exclusion
of jurors with shared racial identity. 23°
Justice Scalia asserted that the majority's decision rested on an
inaccurate interpretation of prior opinions. 231 He characterized the
majority discussion of third-party standing as merely a pretext de-
signed to portray the issue before the court as one of first impres-
sion.232 In framing his argument, Justice Scalia noted that the de-
cisions barring racially discriminatory jury selection practices were
responses to state statutes that kept African-American citizens from
serving as jurors and thus prevented African-American defendants
from receiving equal protection of the law. 233 According to Justice
Scalia, it was historically unthinkable that white defendants could
assert that a statute that barred African-Americans from jury service
violated the white defendants' equal protection rights. 234 Justice
decisions of long standing directed against racial discrimination in the administration of
justice." Id. (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the judgment)). The Court stated:
To bar petitioner's claim because his race differs from that of the excluded
juror's would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty,
honor, and privilege of jury service. .. .
The emphasis in Batson on racial identity between the defendant and the
excused prospective juror is not inconsistent with our holding today that race
is irrelevant to a defendant's standing to object to the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.
Id.
225 See id. at 1374-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 494 (1977) (Mexican-American must establish membership in cognizable group in order
to claim denial of equal protection by exclusion of Mexican-Americans from grand jury);
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972) (black male is not denied equal protection
by exclusion of women from jury lists).
225 See id. at 1377 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"0 See id. at 1374-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing relevant cases).
231 Id, at 1377 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252 Id.
255 Id. at 1374 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234 Id.
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Scalia noted that more than a century of cases upholding defen-
dants' equal protection challenges emphasized the shared racial
identity between the defendant and the stricken juror. 235
Moreover, according to Justice Scalia, the majority's lengthy
discussion of third-party standing was as unfaithful to precedent as
it was to history. 236 On this point, Justice Scalia argued that the
Court had previously considered but rejected using third-party
standing to extend the Equal Protection Clause to a racially dissim-
ilar defendant.237 He concluded that the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees only that the State is not allowed to strike members of
the defendant's race solely because of the shared racial identity. 238
Likewise, Justice Scalia asserted that because excluded jurors
suffer no cognizable equal protection injury, there is no claim for a
defendant to raise on a juror's behalf. 239 According to Justice Scalia,
the excluded juror's lack of first-party standing complicates the
defendant's lack of third-party standing."° Contrary to the major-
ity's reasoning, Justice Scalia asserted that there is no dishonor in
being stricken from a jury. 241 Justice Scalia reasoned that the per-
'emptory strike implies nothing more than the possibility of sym-
pathy toward the defendant."' There is no loss of benefit resulting
from removal, concluded Justice Scalia, because no special benefit
inheres to jurors who serve in a trial where the defendant shares
their racial background.243 Therefore, Justice Scalia reasoned, a
stricken juror suffers no equal protection injury for the defendant
to protect. 244
Justice Scalia concluded with a warning. 245 He cautioned that
holding that the Equal Protection Clause protects individual jurors
235 See id. at 1374-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235 Id. at 1377 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217 Id,
2" Id. at 1376 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that the first requirement
necessary to raise a Raison challenge is for the defendant to show that he is a member of a
cognizable racial group and that the excluded jurors are of the same group. Id. (citing Batson,
476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986)). The Justice found it self-evident that a white defendant could not
satisfy this first requirement. Id. The Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed Powers's claim of
error for this very reason. State v. Powers, No. 87AP-526, 1988 WL 134822, at *9 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 13, 1988).
235
 Powers, 11 1 S. Ct. at 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240 Id. at 1377.
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from discriminatory strikes would end the use of peremptory chal-
lenges in the historical sense."' According to Justice Scalia, the
majority opinion in Powers was thus not only unwise, but also an
unsupported extension of the purpose and rationale of Batson."'
One commentator described the restricted context of standing
as a "substantial hurdle" in extending the Batson rule to defendants'
use of peremptory challenges."' In Powers, however, the Court
created a juror's right that a third-party defendant could assert. 249
According to this same commentator, the creation of such a right
would lead to a reciprocal right for prosecutors to object to a de-
fendant's use of discriminatory strikes. 25°
III. STATE ACTION
The Batson holding relies on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit a prosecutor's use of race-based
strikes. 251
 A number of Supreme Court decisions interpret the Equal
Protection Clause as available to regulate only state action. 252 Be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to private con-
duct, the behavior of private citizens, no matter how discriminatory,
is not subject to constitutional limitations.'" Therefore, unless a
defendant's use of race-based peremptories is considered state ac-
tion, the Batson equal protection prohibition is not controlling. 254
A. Polk County v. Dodson: The Public Defender is Not a State Actor
In the 1981 case of Polk County v. Dodson, the United States
Supreme Court held that the actions of a public defender, when
245
2" Id. at 1381-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"" Alschuler, supra note 27, at 188, 198-99. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in
Powers, cited to Alschuler's article. 111  S. Ct. at 1372.
24"Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1374.
25"Alschuler, supra note 27, at 198-99.
251
 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
252 See National Collegiate Athletic Assoc. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co,, 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417
U.S. 556, 573 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 720 (1961); see
also Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 811-13.
2" Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349.
254 Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 812-13. Professor Goldwasser points out that in Swain
v. Alabama the Supreme Court actually addressed whether the defendant's use of peremp-
tories constitutes state action. Id. at 813. See supra notes 84-167 and accompanying text for
a complete discussion of Swain. In Swain, the Court stated that "the ordinary exercise of
challenges by defense counsel does not, of course, imply purposeful discrimination by state
officials." Id. at 227.





performing the traditional functions of counsel for indigent clients
in criminal proceedings, are not performed "under color of state
law."266 Polk County involved an indigent defendant, Richard Russell
Dodson, who brought an ineffective assistance of counsel action
against his public defender, Martha Shepard, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides for civil actions against the state for depri-
vation of rights. 256 Shepard was assigned to represent Dodson in an
appeal from a robbery conviction. 257
 After reviewing the case, how-
ever, she moved for permission to withdraw, claiming that the ap-
peal was frivolous. 268 The trial court granted her motion and dis-
missed Dodson's appea1. 269
In order to meet the jurisdictional requirement for a section
1983 suit, Dodson had to show that Shepard was a state actor. 26°
The district court, finding that the actions of Shepard in question
were not performed under color of state law, dismissed Dodson's
complaint. 2" 1 The court asserted that a public defender owes a
primary duty to the client and therefore cannot be characterized as
an agent of the state. 262 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court's finding. 263 The appellate court acknowl-
edged that a public defender's first duty is to the client, but deter-
mined the defender's status as a county employee was dispositive
of the state-actor question. 264 The court noted that the public de-
fender is not selected by the client but instead has clients assigned
by the state. 26'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a division
among the circuits and held that a public defender is not a state
actor when performing the traditional functions of defense coun-
sel . 266
 The Court explained that in order for a person's actions to
255 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Generally, "under color of state law" and "state action" are
considered alternative ways of expressing the same legal principle. See Cobb v. Georgia Power
Co., 757 F.2d 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 1985); Briley v. California, 569 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir.
1977); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 877-78 (5th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975).
258 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1988); Polk County, 454 U.S. at 315.
257 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 314.
438 Id.
255 Id. at 315.
26° Id.
251
 Dodson v. Polk County, 483 F. Supp. 347, 350 (S,D. Iowa 1979).
252 Id. at 349.
2115 628 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 198(1).
464
"5 See id,
2116 454 U.S. 312, 317 (1981).
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be characterized as under color of state law, the person must be
using the power granted by the government to perform in a manner
only available to someone with state authority. 267 Representation of
a client, the Court noted, is not a function specific to the state; the
relationship between a public defender and an indigent defendant
is virtually identical to any other attorney-client relationship, apart
from the method of payment. 2"
In reaching its conclusion, the Court described the defense
lawyer as an adversary of the state. 269 The Court noted that the
American legal system is dependent upon this adversarial relation-
ship to assist in finding the truth and promoting fairness in the
judicial system. 27° Therefore, the Court concluded, the defender is
serving the interests of the public, not the interests of the state, by
acting as an adversary."'
The Court did suggest that a public defender may be a state
actor in other situations. 272
 The Court noted that a public defender
had been found a state actor when engaging in hiring and firing
personnel. 2" The Court reasserted, therefore, that a public de-
fender could be considered a state actor when performing other
administrative, or perhaps even investigative, functions. 274
B. Edmonson v. Leesville: Finding State Action in the
Civil Litigants' Challenges
As a result of Powers, the Batson rule still applied only to pros-
ecutors, but now any defendant could object to a prosecutor's race-
based strikes. 275 The Batson Court held that defendants who shared
a racial identity with the excluded jurors could claim a violation of
their equal protection rights. 276 The Powers Court held that any
other defendant could challenge a prosecutor's strikes on behalf of
the struck jurors. 277 To extend the Batson equal protection limita-
267 Id. at 317-18 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
266 Id. at 318.
26Y Id.
"0 Id.
27, Id. at 318-19.
272 Id. at 324-25.
271 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 325 (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 511 (1980)).
214 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 325.
"5 See Powers v. Ohio, 111  S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991).
"6 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
277I l l S. Ct. at 1366.
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tions to a party other than a prosecutor, however, would require
holding that the party was a state actor.278
Following the Batson decision, the federal circuits split regard-
ing the application of the Batson rule in a civil suit.278
 The circuits
disagreed about whether a civil litigant's discriminatory use of a
peremptory strike violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 28° In particular, the circuits could not agree as
to whether a private litigant's use of a peremptory strike could be
characterized as state action. 281
In the 1991 case of Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Su-
preme Court resolved this confusion regarding the scope of the
Batson decision.282
 The Edm'onson Court held that a private litigant
may not use racially motivated peremptory challenges to exclude
otherwise qualified jurors because such discriminatory strikes violate
the equal protection rights of the excluded juror. 288
 The Court
reasoned that a private civil litigant's use of a peremptory strike can
be characterized as state action. 284 Moreover, the Court held that
the parties have standing to assert the rights of the excluded ju-
ror.2"5
The plaintiff in Edmonson, Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, who
was injured while working for Leesville Concrete Company, brought
a negligence suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana. 286
 Edmonson, an African-American construc-
tion worker, alleged that he was injured when a Leesville employee
278
 Alschuler, supra note 27, at 197.
279 Compare Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 F.2d 1281, 1282 (7th Cir.
1990) (private civil litigant may not use peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors
on basis of race) and Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 823 (11th Cir. 1989) (same) with Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1990) (private civil litigants are not
accountable for their use of peremptory challenges).
28" See Dunham, 919 F.2d at 1282.
281 See Dunham, 919 F.2d at 1287; Fludd, 863 F.2d at 829; Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 219.
The circuits in favor of extending Batson to civil trials emphasized the courts' extensive role
in jury selection proceedings in order to find sufficient state action to trigger constitutional
safeguards. See Dunham, 919 F.2d at 1286-87; Fludd, 863 F.2d at 828. The circuit in favor
of giving the Batson rule a narrow application emphasized the courts' limited role in a party's
decision to use a peremptory challenge in order to hold that there was insufficient state
action to merit constitutional protection. See Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221-22.
282 111  S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
282 Id.
284 Id. at 2082-87.
282 Id. at 2087. The Court also held that a civil litigant's prima fade case of the discrim-
inatory use of peremptory challenges is the same as the prima fade case articulated by the
Batson Court. Id. at 2088-89.
286 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
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allowed a Leesville truck to roll backward, pinning him against the
construction equipment. 287 Leesville used two of its three authorized
peremptory challenges to strike African-American prospective ju-
rors. 288 Edmonson requested that the trial court ask Leesville to
articulate race-neutral explanations for the strikes. 289 The trial court
refused on the grounds that Batson did not apply in civil actions. 29"
Edmonson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. 29 ' A divided en banc panel affirmed the trial court
judgment and held that private civil litigants are not required by
law to explain their use of peremptory challenges. 292 The en bane
majority concluded that no state action exists where peremptory
challenges are used by a private party and, therefore, no constitu-
tional guarantees could be invoked by the litigant or the challenged
jurors. 29'
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, reversed the en banc decision:294 The Court held that
racially motivated peremptory strikes offend the equal protection
rights of the dismissed juror, regardless of whether the trial is
criminal or civiI. 296 In order to reach its conclusion, the Court
determined that sufficient state action exists in civil litigation to
warrant applying the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions to the
use of peremptory challenges:296
The Edmonson Court reiterated the Powers presumption that a
prosecutor's racially motivated peremptory strikes violate the equal
2" Id.
26"
	 1 1 I S. Ct. at 2081. The circuit court noted that Edmonson used all three
of his peremptory challenges to remove white venire members while Leesville used its third
challenge to strike a white prospective juror. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310. Ultimately the jury
was composed of eleven white members and one black member. Edmonton, 111  S. Ct. at 2081.
This jury found for Edmonson but found him 80% contributorily negligent, reducing his
damage award from $90,000 to $18,000. Id.
259
290 Id .
291 Id, Initially, a divided panel held that the Batson rule applies to private litigants in
civil cases. id. According to the panel, the fundamental principle of Batson is that "the state's
use, toleration, and approval of peremptory challenges based on race violates the equal
protection clause." 860 F.2d at 1314. The court asserted that private litigants become state
actors when they employ peremptory strikes and that to limit Batson to criminal cases alters
Batson's basic principle. Id. The full court of appeals then voted to hear the Edmonton appeal
en barn:. Edmonson, 111  S. Ct. at 2081.
292 See Edmonson, 895 F.2d 218, 226 (5th Cir. 1990).
2" See id. at 222.
2" Edmonson, 1 l 1 S. Ct. at 2081.
295 See id. at 2082.
290 See id. at 2084-85. The Fourteenth Amendment does not impact private discrimi-
nation. See id. at 2082.
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protection rights of the removed juror and that the defendant has
third-party standing to raise the claims of the excluded juror. 297
The Court noted that the Powers rationale was based on over a
century of cases intended to remove racial discrimination from the
jury selection process. 298 While these cases primarily dealt with stop-
ping government discrimination in criminal proceedings, the Court
found no implicit approval of discrimination in the civil setting,
where the injury to the juror is just as harmful. 299
Although the Court made clear its distaste for the use of racially
discriminatory peremptory strikes in civil proceedings, the Court
conceded that an act that violates the Constitution when committed
by a government official does not necessarily offend the Constitu-
tion when performed by a private individual. 3°° The Court asserted,
however, that government involvement in an activity may be so
pervasive as to render the activity state action and the participants
state actors subject to constitutional constraints, despite the partic-
ipation of private citizens."' The Court then examined whether
employing peremptory challenges in civil litigation is such an activ-
i ty 302
The Court began its analysis by describing the two-part struc-
ture for determining the • presence of state action." 3 The Court
stated that the initial inquiry examines if the claimed divestiture of
equal protection rights may arise from the operation of some right
or privilege having its origin in state authority."4 The Court found
it obvious that peremptory challenges originate in state authority,
because peremptory challenges are permitted only when the gov-
ernment authorizes their use through statute or common law."'
Because there is no constitutional right to engage in peremptory
strikes, the Court concluded, the defendant Leesville, or any other
297 Id. at 2081.
2" Id. at 2081-82.
2,9 1d. at 2082.
"a Id, The Court noted that constitutional guarantees generally limit only the scope of
government behavior, not the behavior of private persons or entities. Id.
'O 1 Id.
"2 Id.
Edmonson, 11 1 S. Ct. at 2082-83 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
937 (1982)).
"4 Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-4I (1982)).
5°5 Id. at 2083. The Court observed that legislative grants and restrictions concerning
peretnptories date hack to the founding of the Republic. Id. The Court also noted that
peremptory challenges exist only inside a court of law, where their sole purpose is to allow
litigants to assist the government in selecting an impartial jury. Id.
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private civil litigant, could not participate in the alleged discrimi-
natory behavior unless the government authorized the use of the
peremptory challenge."
The Edmonson Court then identified the second inquiry in its
state action analysis as the determination of whether a private civil
litigant who employs government-authorized peremptory chal-
lenges can be characterized as a state actor."' The Court identified
three circumstances when the actions of a private person or entity
can be considered governmental in nature. 308 The first circumstance
occurs if the private actor relies on benefits and assistance from the
government." The second circumstance arises when the private
actor carries out a traditional government function. 31 ° The third
situation is created when the operations of government markedly
increase the claimed deprivation.3 " The Edmonson Court deter-
mined that all three circumstances arise when the civil litigant uses
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. 312
The Court reasoned that the first situation is implicated by the
litigant's use of federal jury service procedures and the trial judge's
306 See id. The Court quoted 28 U.S.C. 1870, which not only grants each party three
peremptory challenges but also gives discretion to the trial judge to allow for more challenges
in cases involving several defendants or plaintiffs. Id.
3" Edmonson, ill S. Ct. at 2083.
"3 Id. The Court acknowledged that a "state actor" determination often centers on the
peculiar facts of an individual situation. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
939 (1982)).
"Id. at 2083 (citing Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,
487-88 (1988); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961)). In Tulsa,
the Court found a valid due process claim when a creditor's assignee received no notice
before a probate claim was time-barred and the defendant made use of state procedures
with overt, significant assistance of state officials. 485 U.S. at 487-88. In Burton, the Court
found a valid equal protection claim when a private restaurant, operating under a govern-
ment lease in a building owned by a state agency, barred black customers. 365 U.S. at 726.
310 Edmonson, 1 1 1 S. Ct. at 2083 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988); Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946)).
In Terry, the Court found sufficient state action to support a Fifteenth Amendment claim
when a private all-white voter's association held an internal pre-primary election that effec-
tively determined the outcome of the public primary. In Marsh, the Court found sufficient
state action to support a First Amendment claim when a company-owned suburb outlawed
religious literature distribution on a company-owned sidewalk. In West, the Court held that
a private physician who contracts with a state prison is a state actor. Cf. San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (no state
action to support Fifth Amendment claim where defendant committee received corporate
charter and substantial funding from Congress but enforced trademark as private corpora-
tion).
' 11 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1948)).
In Shelley, the Court found a valid equal protection claim when a state court was called upon
to enforce private racially restrictive property covenants. 334 U.S. at 19-21.
' 17 Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2083.
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control over the jury selection process." As support, the Court
referred to the numerous federal statutes that address all aspects
of jury service, including juror qualifications, random selection pro-
cedures, non-exclusion criteria and the lawful excuse provision. 314
Also, the Court noted that the trial judge directly assists the private
litigant by enforcing the discriminatory strike."
According to the Court, the second circumstance—the perfor-
mance of a traditional governmental function by a private person—
is also implicated by the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 316 The
Court concluded that because the jury is a governmental body, the
selection of the jury is a governmental responsibility. 3 " Therefore,
the Court reasoned, when the government delegates its selection
power to a private body, it delegates a governmental function and,
with the delegation, the constitutional mandate of equal protec-
tion.3 " As a result, the Court concluded, participating in the jury
selection process is participating in a function traditionally per-
formed by the government. 3 '•
On this point the Court distinguished its 1981 decision in Polk
County v. Dodson, which held that a public defender is not a state
actor when engaged in representing a criminal defendant. 32° The
Edmonson Court responded to defendant Leesville's reliance on Polk
County by noting that the public defender's adversarial relationship
to the government was an important factor in the Polk County de-
cision.321 The Edmonson Court asserted that within the specifics of
31 ' Id. at 2083-85. The Court observed that state-sanctioned but otherwise private pro-
cedures do not rise to the level of state action unless the private party also receives substantial
assistance from the government. Id. at 2083-84.
314 Id. at 2084 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1864, 1869 (1988)).
313 Id. at 2084-85. The Court suggested that such a degree of government assistance
makes the court not only a "'party to the [biased acti" but also puts the court's "'power,
property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination. — Id. at 2085 (quoting Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
31" Id. at 2085.
3" See id. The Court reasoned that because a jury weighs evidence, judges witness
credibility and renders verdicts, it must be considered a governmental body. Id.
"a See id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841-42 (1982); Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953)). In Terry, the Court held the Fifteenth Amendment applied to
a private voter association when it was selecting public candidates in county elections. In
Rendell-Baker, the Court held that a private school, which was not compelled or influenced
by state regulations in its discharge of school employees, was not subject to constitutional
constraints.
319 See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
3" Id. (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)).
921 /d. (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 n.13 (1981)).
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jury selection, however, both public and private litigants work to-
ward the same governmental end, the selection of the jury. 322
Finally, the Court concluded that the final circumstance—ag-
gravation of the injury by operation of state authority—is present
when a litigant uses a discriminatory strike. 323 The Court stated that
the injury is aggravated because the discrimination occurs in a court
of law. 324 Noting that a trial is a public proceeding for the purpose
of securing justice, the Court reasoned that racial discrimination
within the courtroom mars the integrity of the judicial proceeding
and offends the dignity of the public and the courts. 325 The Court
concluded that allowing racial discrimination in an official forum
only intensifies the injury to the excluded juror. 326
The Court emphatically asserted that the courtroom, whether
civil or criminal, must be free of racial bias. 327 The Court stated
that even if the public perceives the jury system as fair because of
the parties' role in shaping the jury, "if race stereotypes are the
price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to
meet the standard of, the Constitution." 328 The Court then re-
manded the case to the trial court to decide if plaintiff Edmonson
had put forth a prima facie case of race discrimination. 329
522 See id. The Court stated that in civil litigation not involving the government, the
government and litigants are not involved in an adversarial relationship. Id. When selecting
a jury, the government and private litigants work together. Id. The private litigant therefore
becomes a government actor when using peremptories during jury selection. Id. The gov-
ernment delegates selection of jurors to private litigants, but the action is attributable to the
government and protected by the Constitution. Id.
32 ' Id. at 2087.
3" Id.
525 Id,
"6 Id. The remainder of the Court's opinion in Edmonson consisted of a Powers three-
part standing analysis. See id. at 2087-88. The Court concluded that a real injury exists for
the private litigant because the allowance of race-based juror exclusions raises doubts as to
the integrity and fairness the litigant receives from the judicial process. See id. at 2087-88.
The Court observed that there is a direct connection between the litigant and the jurors in
any proceeding and that substantial cost and time barriers are present that make it unlikely
that excluded jurors will initiate discrimination suits. Id. The Court therefore held that a
private litigant has sufficient third-party standing to raise the equal protection claims of
excluded jurors. Id. at 2087.
1" Id. at 2088.
32 N Id.
529 Edmonson, 111  S. Ct. at 2088-89. The Court observed that the Batson prima facie case
requires the consideration of all relevant evidence, including whether there is any pattern in
the challenges against a particular race. Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97
(1986)). The Court stated that it was leaving to the trial court the task of developing
evidentiary standards for implementing its decision. Id. at 2089.
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In her dissent, Justice O'Connor challenged the majority's con-
clusion that the decision to exercise a peremptory challenge is a
public act.'" Justice O'Connor contended that the nature of the
peremptory is one of private choice."' Although she recognized
that the government is intimately involved with creating and pro-
viding a forum to resolve private quarrels, Justice O'Connor as-
serted that the government is not responsible for the actions of
private litigants in the government-sponsored courtroom. 332
Justice O'Connor argued that the majority decision rested on
two erroneous assumptions: first, that the exercise of peremptory
challenges by a ,private litigant requires significant government as-
sistance; and second, that the exercise is a traditional government
function." Justice O'Connor reasoned that no government assis-
tance is involved when a litigant decides to use a peremptory
strike.334 She argued that much of the statutory evidence used by
the Court to show government assistance in the exercise of a per-
emptory strike was irrelevant and independent from the specific
statutory grant of power. 335 Justice O'Connor described the extent
of government participation in a litigant's use of a peremptory
challenge as authorizing the procedure and allowing any individual
challenge to take place.'" This limited participation, according to
"" Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia joined in Justice
O'Connor's dissent. Id.
"' Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated:
it is the nature of a peremptory that its exercise is left wholly within the
discretion of the litigant. The purpose of this long standing practice is to
establish for each party an "'arbitrary and capricious species of challenge —
whereby the "'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another" may be acted upon.
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S 370, 376 (1892), quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE., COMMENTARIES *353.
Id. at 2089-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
332 See id, at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor asserted that one common
rule has emerged from earlier state action cases: constitutional guarantees of equal protection
apply only where the "'[government] is responsible for the specific conduct of which the
plaintiff complains. — Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
333 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
334 See id. at 2090-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
33.'
	
at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor contended that the Court's
statutory evidence related io the government's obligation of providing jury panels and not
to government participation in selecting individual jurors. Id. Justice O'Connor analogized
the majority's use of the federal statutes to claiming that "the building of roads and provision
of public transportation makes state action of riding on a bus." Id.
33"/d. at 2090-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor observed that a judge's
acquiescence to the removal of a juror falls well below the level of state involvement in cases
111 8
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Justice O'Connor, did not rise to the level of the significant assis-
tance standard. 337
Next, Justice O'Connor argued that the use of a peremptory
strike is not a traditional government function because the purpose
of the challenge is to refuse jurors, not to select jurors. 538 On this
point, Justice O'Connor argued that the majority misinterpreted
precedent by failing to recognize that for private action to be con-
sidered state action, the private action must be an exclusively gov-
ernmental function. 3" Because peremptory challenges are not the
exclusive province of state or federal officials, but instead are ex-
ercised rather frequently by private entities, Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that their use cannot be considered traditionally govern-
mental in character. 34°
Contrary to the majority's reasoning, Justice O'Connor asserted
that Polk County was controlling in the present case because it illus-
trated that a lawyer's actions in the courtroom are not state action
when the lawyer represents a private client." 41 Justice O'Connor
reasoned that it is a private choice to exercise strikes, no matter
who makes the decision—private counsel or public defender. 342 By
where the Court held that state action existed. Id. at 2090-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citing Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 487 (1988) (state
statute directed executrix to publish notice and district court issued order requiring the
same); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (state agency was so
involved with private restaurant that the Court held them to be "joint participants" in alleged
discrimination); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 19 (1948) (state court was petitioned to
enforce facially discriminatory restrictive covenants)).
Justice O'Connor argued that the state activity in the present case was more analogous
to the state activity in a 1978 case, Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, and a 1974 case, Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., cases in which the Court held that no state action existed. Id. at 2091-
92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978)
(warehouseman relied on non-mandatory New York UCC provisions in his proposed sale of
non-paying customer's goods); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974)
(private utility terminated plaintiff's service via procedures approved by state utility com-
mission)).
337 See Edmonson, III S. Ct. at 2092 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
338 See id. Justice O'Connor noted the common law roots of the challenge and observed
that the procedure has traditionally been implemented by "unguided private choice," not
government action. Id. at 2092-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
339 Id. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor pointed to the exclusively
governmental functions recognized in earlier state action cases. Id, at 2093-94; see also Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468-70 (1953) (public elections); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
508-09 (1946) (community government); cf. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43
(1982) (private schools); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358-59 (private utilities).
'44 See Edmonton, 111 S. Ct. at 2093-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'4, Id. at 2094 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
318-19 (1981)).
si4 Id. at 2094-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In effect, Justice O'Connor noted, lawyers
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employing strikes, argued Justice O'Connor, counsel perform the
traditional adversarial function of protecting clients' interests.ms In
conclusion, Justice O'Connor recognized the unjust nature of racial
discrimination, but reiterated that not every unjust or injurious act
is unconstitutional,'" She noted that because the government is not
responsible for a private litigant's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges, the defendant had no equal protection claim. 345
Justice Scalia also filed a separate dissent. 346 He argued that the
majority decision was more harmful than helpful to minority inter-
ests. 947 Justice Scalia asserted that, after Edmonson, courts would
have to apply Batson to criminal defendants. 348 He reasoned that if
all race-based peremptory strikes are prohibited, then minority de-
fendants lose the opportunity to maximize sympathetic jurors by
striking white venire members. 349 Justice Scalia also argued that
because the time involved in forcing civil litigants to show race-
neutral causes for peremptory strikes would promote delay and
inhibit the court from reaching the merits of the case, the Court's
decision created additional burdens for overcrowded courts. 35°
In sum, the Edmonton Court concluded that a litigant's use of
peremptory challenges is sufficiently associated with government
conduct to be attributed to the state. 35 ' The Edmonson decision also
implied that, like a civil litigant's peremptory challenges, a criminal
defendant's use of peremptory strikes might be considered state
action."2 Nevertheless, the Court distinguished civil litigants from
criminal defendants, noting that civil litigants are not in an adver-
sarial relationship with the state." 3 Still, the Edmonson holding, cou-
pled with the Powers holding that created race-neutral standing,
persuaded the three Georgia Supreme Court dissenters in State v.
step into the shoes of their clients; therefore, so as long as the client is private, the lawyer's
actions in the courtroom are private. See id.
3" Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
344 Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
343 1d.
346 Id. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
347 See id.
343 Id. Justice Scalia said that "the effect of [Edmonson v. Leesville] (which logically must
apply to criminal prosecutions) will be to prevent the defendant from [using race-based strikes]
so that the minority defendant can no longer seek to prevent an all-white jury, or to seat as
many jurors of his own race as possible." Id.
343 Id.
333 See id. at 2095.-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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McCollum that Batson governed a criminal defendant's use of per-
emptory challenges.354
IV. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: WHAT'S LEFT FOR THE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
State courts and state legislatures have been reluctant to place
limitations on a criminal defendant's employment of peremptory
challenges. Those state courts that first limited the defendant's
strikes used non-equal protection reasoning. 355 State courts, like the
Supreme Court, recently became more willing to extend the Batson
equal protection reasoning. 358 Nevertheless, before McCollum, only
two state high courts and two circuit courts employed an equal
protection analysis to prohibit defendants' race-based strikes. 357
Likewise, although state legislatures also had authority to prohibit
racially motivated strikes, none limited defendant strikes. 358 The
United States Supreme Court, in Georgia v. McCollum, ended state
control of criminal defendants' racially motivated challenges. 359
A. The Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory, Challenges in the
State and Lower Federal Courts
Very few states sought to limit the use of peremptory chal-
lenges.'" Generally, objection to the use of discriminatory strikes
was based not on an equal protection provision of the state's con-
stitution, but rather on some other provision of that constitution. 38 '
164 405 S.E.2d 688, 689, 691, 693 (Hunt, J., Benham, J., Fletcher, J., dissenting separately)
(Ga. 1991).
" 5 See Goldwasser, supra note 13 at 810, & n.13.
"6 See State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849-50 (Haw. 1990); People v. Kern, 554 N.E•2d
1235, 1236 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111  S. Ct. 77 (1990).
" 7
 United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd and remanded
960 F.2d 1443 (1992) (en bane); Kern, 554 N•E.2d at 1236; Levinson, 795 P.2d at 850; see also
United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 948 F.2d 934 (1991).
" 8 See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 55, at 376-77. See infra notes 426-30 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the failure of state legislatures to regulate peremptory
challenges.
"9
 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
360 See Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 810 & n.13; E. Vaughn Dunnigan, supra note 145
at 355 n.2.
MI See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 758 (Cal. 1974) (decided under California
Constitution); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515 (Mass.) (decided under Mas-
sachusetts Constitution), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). Even when the state courts based
their decisions in part under the United States Constitution, they did not invoke the Four-
teenth Amendment as a means of regulating peremptory challenges. See Holley v. J & S
Sweeping Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 74, 77 (Ct. App. 1983) (decided under California Constitution
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Only three state courts placed restrictions on a defendant's use of
discriminatory strikes. 362
California's high court, which was the first to limit discrimina-
tory challenges in any way, is one of three courts that extended
restrictions to defendants prior to Batson. 363 In 1978, the Supreme
Court of California held in People v. Wheeler that strikes motivated
by group bias violate the California Constitution's version of the
Sixth Amendment. 364 The court relied upon Article I, Section 16,
of the California Constitution, which states that "trial by jury is an
inviolate right and shall be secured to all." 365 The court asserted
that the right to an impartial jury is implicit. 366
Wheeler involved two African-American men charged with the
murder of a white grocery store owner during a robbery. 367
The prosecutor used several of his peremptory challenges to re-
move every African-American prospective juror. 3" The resulting
all-white jury convicted the defendants. 369
In reversing the judgments, the Supreme Court of California
reasoned that the jury must be representative of the community in
order to achieve a fair tria1. 370 The court noted that discriminatory
strikes undermine any attempt to empanel a jury that approximates
a cross section of the community."' The Wheeler court thus estab-
lished that discriminatory use of peremptory strikes violates the
and Seventh Amendment); Fields v, People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Colo. 1987) (decided under
Colorado Constitution and Sixth Amendment).
362 See, e.g., Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29 ("Mhe People no less than individual defen-
dants are entitled to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of
the community."); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1983) rile state, no less than the
defendant, is entitled to an impartial jury."); Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35 ("1Wle deem the
Commonwealth equally to he entitled to a representative jury, unimpaired by improper
exercise of peremptory challenges, by the defense."); see also Dunnigan, supra note 145 at 355
n.2. To avoid facing the possibility of limiting a defendant's use of strikes, a number of pre-
Batson federal circuit courts declined to consider a prosecutor's motivations for using per-
emptory challenges. Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 810 (citing United States v. Leslie, 783
F.2d 541, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 250 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977)).
363 See Saltzburg and Powers, supra note 54, at 349 & n.56.
364 583 P.2d 748, 758 (1978).
365 Id. at 754.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 752.
'6'1d. at 752-53.
369 1d. at 752, 754.
576 Id. at 762. The court recognized that the random process of selecting prospective
jurors would sometimes lead to unbalanced juries. Id.
3" Id. at 761.
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defendant's right under the state constitution to trial by a jury
drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 372
In a footnote to its decision, the Wheeler court asserted that this
right to trial by a jury that fairly represents the community extends
to the State as well as defendants. 373 The highest courts in Massa-
chusetts, Florida and New Jersey adopted the Wheeler decision. 374
Other state courts that considered the question of a prosecutor's
right to employ discriminatory strikes, however, did not address the
issue of a defendant's use of such challenges. 375 Since Batson, how-
ever, a few state courts have used the equal protection clauses of
their state constitutions to place limits on a defendant's use of
peremptory challenges. 376 The New York high court was the first
to extend equal protection reasoning to criminal defendants. 377
In 1990, in People v. Kern, the Court of Appeals for New York
held that the state's equivalent of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits the defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
575
 Id. at 761-62.
373
 Id. at 765 n.29.
374 Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1983); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1155
(N.J. 1986). In the 1979 case of Commonwealth v. Soaiis, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth prohibits
the use of peremptory challenges solely to eliminate members of certain recognized com-
munity groups from the jury. See 387 N.E.2d at 515 & n.29, 516 & n.33. (state constitution
prohibits juror exclusion on basis of sex, race, color, creed or national origin). Soares involved
three African-American men who participated in a street fight in Boston's "Combat Zone"
with members of the Harvard University football team following a team celebration. Id. at
502-03, 505. Defendants were convicted of first degree murder of one team member as well
as various assault charges. Id. at 502-03. At trial, the prosecution used peremptory challenges
to strike twelve of the thirteen African-Americans qualified to sit on the jury. Id. at 508. The
Soares court adopted the reasoning of People v. Wheeler, asserting that the state constitution
required that a jury approximate a fair cross section of the community. Id. at 515 & n.30.
The Soares court emphasized that allowance of discriminatory strikes would nullify the right
to trial drawn from a representative cross section, Id. The court thus established that the use
of discriminatory strikes to exclude members of "discrete" groups merely because of pre-
sumption of group bias violates the cross section requirement. Id. at 516. Citing the Wheeler
court, the Soares court noted that the decision would extend to defense use of peremptories.
Id. at 517 n.35. The Supreme Court of Florida likewise adopted the Wheeler and Soares
decisions, although limiting its holding to apply only when discriminatory strikes are used
against African-Americans. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487. The New Jersey decision, State v. Gilmore,
511 A.2d at 1166 was decided after Batson was handed down.
373 See Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1012 (Del. 1985), cot. denied, 487 U.S. 1022 (1986);
State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 717-18 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
376
 State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990); People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235,
1236 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111  S. Ct. 77 (1990); People v. Gary M., 526 N.Y.S.2d 986, 994 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988).




lenges. 378 Kern involved three white teens charged with manslaugh-
ter, based upon their participation in an attack against three
African-American men. 3 " During jury selection, the defendants
employed peremptory strikes to remove those prospective African-
American jurors whom they could not remove for cause. 38° The
prosecution moved the trial court to require that the defendants
provide race-neutral explanations for the strikes."' The trial court
granted the motion and held the defendants to the Batson rule for
future challenges. 382 The defendants appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for New York, arguing that neither the state constitution nor
the Federal Constitution limits a criminal defendant's exercise of
peremptory strikes."'
The Court of Appeals held that the civil rights clause and the
equal protection clause of the New York Constitution prohibit race-
based strikes. 384 First, the court reasoned that jury service is a priv-
ilege of citizenship and therefore merits protection from racial dis-
crimination."5 The court noted that the state legislature declared
petit jury service a civil right. 386 The court stated that race-based
strikes harm the excluded juror by denying that juror the privilege
to participate in the judicial system. 387 The Kern court also noted
that the state may not disqualify citizens from the venire because of
race.'" The court concluded that eliminating racial discrimination
378 554 N.E.2d at 1236.
379 Id. Kern was an appeal from the highly publicized "Howard Beach Trial." Id. The
Howard Beach incident occurred in December of 1986, when a group of white teens chased
and viciously attacked three African-American men who were visiting a neighborhood piz-
zeria. See id. at 1236-38. One man was killed when, in an attempt to flee, he ran across a
highway and was struck by a car. Id. at 1238.
38a Id, at 1239.
381 Id.
382 Id. For a variety of reasons, a number of prospective jurors that the defendants
unsuccessfully attempted to strike were not seated on the jury. Id. The jury that ultimately
convicted the three appellants contained no jurors to whom the defendants objected. Id. at
1239-40.
3" Id. at 1240.
384 Id. at 1241.
383 Id. at 1242.
3" Id. at 1243 (citing N.Y. Civ. RIGH'rs LAW § 13 (McKinney 1991) "No citizen of the
state . . . shall he disqualified to serve as a juror ... on account of race."). The court rejected
the defendants' assertion that the statute was meant to govern the Jury Commissioner's
behavior. Id.
387 Id. at 1242 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986); McCray v. New
York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)). The Kern court also asserted that discriminatory
strikes harm society by casting doubt upon the integrity of criminal trial proceedings. Id.
388 Id.
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from venire selection is meaningless if parties could subsequently
strike a juror because of race."9
 Thus, the court held that the civil
rights clause of the state constitution prohibits use of peremptory
challenges for purposeful racial exclusion. 390
The Kern court then considered whether discriminatory strikes
violate the state constitution's equal protection provision."' The
court noted that the Batson decision described prosecutorial race-
based strikes as violating the equal protection rights of jurors and
damaging public perception of the judicial system. 392 The court also
noted that Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, concluded that the same
restrictions would "inevitably" apply to the defense. 393 The Kern
court intimated that the state was acting to protect the rights of
both the excluded jurors and the community. 394
The Kern court then proceeded to reply to defendants' asser-
tion that because they were not state actors, they could not violate
the state equal protection clause. 395
 The court held that the state is
sufficiently involved in defendants' peremptory challenges to char-
acterize defendants as state actors. 396
 The court reasoned that state
action is present when the violative action is "fairly attributable to
the state."397
 Such attributable actions occur, stated the Kern court,
when the state is involved in and enforces the prohibited conduct.396
The court concluded that the state is significantly involved in the
defendants' use of peremptory strikes because the state authorizes
559 Id.
59° Id. at 1243.
n' Id.
592 Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1986)).
"" Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 125-26 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
5" Id. at 1244.
195 Id.
3" Id. at 1246. In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that the defendants' reliance
on Polk County v. Dodson was misplaced. Id. at 1244-45. The Kern court read the Polk County
decision narrowly, asserting that Polk County established only that the actions of a state
employee are not necessarily attributable to the state. Id. at 1244. See supra notes 255-74
and accompanying text for complete discussion of Polk County.
"7 Kern, 554 N.E.2d at 1244 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982)).
"" Id. As an example, the Kern court referred to Shelley v. Kraemer as an example of state
enforcement and participation in discriminatory behavior. Id. (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. I, 19 (1948)). In Shelley, the Court held that judicial enforcement of racially discrimi-
natory restrictive covenants is state action because "the States have made available to [persons
choosing to discriminate] the full coercive power of government to deny [black citizens] the
enjoyment of property rights." Id. In her Edmonson v. Leesville dissent, Justice O'Connor
distinguished Shelley, noting that the state courts used coercive force to encourage discrimi-
nation and impose conformity on parties who did not choose to discriminate. 111  S. Ct.
2077, 2091 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting.)
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the use of peremptory challenges, summons jurors to service and
oversees voir dire. 399
 Moreover, the juror sits in a public courtroom,
is informed of dismissal from service by the judge, and is escorted
from the courtroom by uniformed officials:400
 Thus, the court held
that the defendants' use of discriminatory strikes is state action
subject to the New York state equal protection provision, which
prohibits the use of race-based challenges.401 At Least one other
court has already adopted the Kern reasoning. 4°2 In a 1990 case,
the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause of
the Hawaii State Constitution prohibits defendants from exercising
discriminatory challenges.403
Only the Ninth and Fifth Circuits directly addressed the issue
of whether Batson applies to a defendant's use of peremptory chat-
lenges. 404
 In the 1990 case of United States v. De Gross, the Ninth
Circuit held that equal protection principles limit a criminal defen-
dant's use of discriminatory strikes:1 °5 In De Gross, the United States
objected to defendant De Gross's use of peremptory challenges to
remove male venirepersons. 4N The court first reasoned that the
government has standing to assert the equal protection rights of
the stricken jurors."' The court then asserted that a defendant's
use of peremptory challenges is state action because the right to use
strikes is a right created by the state and because the defendant is
assisted by state procedures and state officials:10s Thus, the court
held that criminal defendants are subject to the constraints of Batson
when engaging in peremptory strikes, 409
In the 1992 en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
1990 decision, holding that equal protection principles prohibit a
criminal defendant from peremptorily striking a venireperson on
the basis of gender.41 ° The court addressed several issues including
399 Kern, 554 N.E.2d at 1245.
lou Id.
401 Id. at 1246.
"2 Slate v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849-50 (Haw. 1990).
"3 Id. The Hawaii court extended the reach of Kern by including discriminatory gender
strikes. Id. at 849-50.
404
 United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd and remanded
960 F.2d 1433 (1992) (en bane); United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 948 F.2d 934 (1991). See supra note 426 for a discussion of State v. Greer.
"5 De Gross, 913 F.2d at 1423.
"9 Id. at 1419. De Gross was female. Id.
4" Id. at 1421.
400 Id. at 1423-24.
"9 Id. at 1423.
410 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (1992) (en banc). De Grass was overturned on the grounds that
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(1) whether the government has standing to object to a defendant's
strike; (2) whether a gender-based peremptory challenge, like a
race-based one, is unconstitutional; and (3) whether equal protec-
tion constraints limit criminal defendants, like prosecutors, from
exercising discriminatory challenges. 411 The court reasoned that,
under Powers, the government has standing to object to a criminal
defendant's peremptory challenges based on the government's own
injury and the injury to the challenged venirepersons. 412 The court
also reasoned that Edmonson imposed equal protection limits on
criminal defendants' peremptory challenges. 4 " Thus, the De Gross
decision expanded the Batson principle in terms of both protected
classes and prohibited parties. 414
First, the court explained that the violation of the venireper-
son's rights injures the government by impugning the jury system. 415
The court then stated that the government's relationship to veni-
repersons is sufficient to ensure that it will vigorously defend their
rights:416 Finally, the court pointed out that it is unlikely that ex-
cluded venirepersons would assert their own rights because of pro-
the prosecutor's purposeful gender discrimination against a juror violated De Gross's Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Id. at 1442-43.
4""
	 at 1436-42.
412 Id. at 1436-37.
4 " Id. at 1439-40.
414 See id. at 1443. In extending Batson, the De Gross court stated that all of the evils that
the Batson decision was designed to eliminate also arise when gender discrimination is per-
mitted. Id. at 1438. Among these "evils", the court listed: (I) harm to the excluded venire-
persons; (2) undermining of public confidence in the judicial system; and (3) stimulation of
community prejudice. Id.
Additionally, the court noted that sexually discriminatory peremptory strikes violate the
defendant's right to be tried by a jury chosen pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. Id. The
court noted that strikes based on gender, like strikes based on race, have nothing to do with
an individual's qualifications as a juror. Id.
While the court recognized that the governmental objective of impaneling a fair and
impartial jury is important, it found that strikes based on gender are not substantially related
to achieving this objective. Id. at 1439. The court stated that only strikes based on a party's
"sudden and immediate impression that a particular venireperson will be partial" would
foster the impaneling of an impartial jury, and gender-based strikes by definition are not
based on such impressions. Id. Rather, the court pointed out, gender-based strikes are based
on either the false assumption that members of a certain group are unqualified to serve as
jurors or on the false assumption that members of a certain group cannot impartially consider
the case against a member of their group. /d. Such false assumptions cannot justify gender
discrimination any more than they can justify racial discrimination. See id. at 1442.
4" Id. at 1436.
416 Id. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976) (holding that third-party
standing is permissible only where the third party will defend as hardily as would the party
whose rights are being protected).
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cedural difficulties and lack of incentive due to small financial stakes
and the expense of litigation." t7
In order to legitimize the position that Batson's constitutional
prohibition applied to a criminal defendant, the court concluded
that a defendant's peremptory strike is state action.'" The court
determined that the logic of the Supreme Court's decision in Ed-
monson was applicable in a criminal context. 419 In finding state ac-
tion, the court noted, the parties "make extensive use of state pro-
cedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials" in
exercising peremptory challenges. 42° The court also characterized
the peremptory challenge as a "unique governmental function del-
egated to private litigants by the government and attributable to
the government for purposes of invoking constitutional protection
against discrimination," whether in a civil or criminal context. 421
Finally, following the Edmonson reasoning, the court concluded that
the injury caused by discriminatory peremptories is aggravated by
the fact that the government allows it to occur in the courthouse. 422
A concurrence to the majority decision argued that the holding
of Edmonson should be confined to the civil arena.425 The concur-
rence asserted that a criminal defendant cannot fairly be described
as a state actor because in a criminal trial, as opposed to a civil trial,
an adversarial relationship exists between the defendant and the
state:124 The concurrence stated that the "defendant's and the pros-
ecutor's interest in criminal cases are in direct conflict at every stage,
including that of jury selection . . . ," and therefore the Edmonson
reasoning must be limited to civil proceedings. 425 The concurrence,
quoting Act II of Gilbert and Sullivan's The Pirates of Penzance, called
the majority's state action analysis "A Paradox, A Paradox / A most
ingenious paradox . . . ," and suggested that the majority's concerns
about legitimizing the discrimination could be assuaged by a simple
disclaimer by the judge to prospective jurors before the commence-
ment of voir dire. 426
41 ' Id.
415 1d. at 1440.
411' Id,
425 1d.
421 Id. at 1441.
422 Id.
425 /d. at 1445. (Reinhardt, C.J., concurring in judgment).
421 Id. at 1444. (Reinhardt, C.J., concurring in judgment).
425 Id.
424 Id. at 1447, n.6. (Reinhardt, GI, concurring in judgment). The majority, rejecting
the concurrence's distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, argued that the conflict
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In addition to court-imposed limits, state legislatures have also
placed limits upon peremptory challenges. 427 Because states autho-
rize peremptory challenges, state legislatures may regulate their
use.428 Texas seems to be the only state to have used this regulatory
power to prohibit prosecutorial use of discriminatory strikes.429 The
Texas statute empowers the defendant and judge to remove the
entire jury pool if the prosecutor engages in discriminatory
strikes. 43° No state, however, has enacted legislation preventing a
defendant from using discriminatory strikes, other than those states
that have codified judicial decisions."'
In sum, previous to the Supreme Court deciding Georgia v.
McCollum, only the New York Court of Appeals, the Hawaii Su-
preme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth
and Fifth Circuits applied Batson limitations to a criminal defen-
dant's peremptory challenges."' Some state courts used other rea-
soning, such as their Sixth Amendment equivalents, to limit a crim-
inal defendant's use of peremptory challenges. 433 State legislatures,
despite their apparent ability to do so, did not prohibit discrimi-
natory strikes by criminal defendants. 434
B. Georgia v. McCollum: The Demise of the Peremptory Challenge
In the 1992 case of Georgia v. McCollum, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits a criminal de-
between the defendant and the State is purely conceptual. Id. at 1441. Rather, the court
opined, while the defendant's interests are opposed to those of the prosecutor, the defendant's
interests are consistent with the state's interest in administering a fair and just trial. Id.
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit also limited criminal defendants' use of discrim-
inatory strikes. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 948
F.2d 934 (1991). In Greer, the court held that Edmonson rendered the Batson prohibitions
applicable to criminal defendants' peremptories. Id. at 1085-86, 1086 n.9. The court con-
cluded that Batson prohibits peremptory challenges based on race, religion or national origin.
Id. at 1086.
927 See, e.g., TEX. GRIM. Noc. CODE ANN. art. 35.261 (West 1989); A. CODE vol. 23A,
rule 18.4 (1990).
42° See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 54, at 376-77. The Supreme Court has stated that
the matter of peremptory challenges is under legislative control. E.g., Hayes v. Missouri, 120
U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (legislature has power to determine number of peremptory challenges
made available to each party).
429 TEX. CRim• PROC. CODE ANN. art. 35.261 (West 1989) (granting defendant right to
request a new jury pool if prosecution uses race-based peremptories).
43° Id.
4" See generally the state statutes relating to jury selection and criminal proceedings.
4" See supra notes 377-408 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 359-74 and accompanying text.




fendant from using racially motivated peremptory challenges. 4"
The Court reasoned that a criminal defendant's use of racially
motivated strikes offends the Equal Protection Clause of the Con-
stitution because such use of challenges harms the excluded jurors
and the community, 436 and because the criminal defendant can be
considered a state actor subject to constitutional constraints. 437 The
McCollum decision established that no party in any proceeding may
use a peremptory strike to exclude a juror solely on the basis of
race. 4"
McCollum involved three white family members who ran a dry-
cleaning business in Albany, Georgia. 439 The McCollums were
charged with assaulting two customers, a married African-American
couple. 44° Race became a central issue in the case when the African-
American community widely distributed a pamphlet alleging that
the attack was racially motivated and requesting a boycott of the
McCollums' business."' At the McCollums' trial, before voir dire
began, the State motioned the court to prohibit the McCollums from
striking African-Americans from the jury. 442 The trial court denied
the motion and the State made an interlocutory appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Georgia."'
In a two-paragraph opinion, the Supreme Court of Georgia
refused to extend the Batson rule to the criminal defendant's use of
peremptory challenges.444 The court noted that the United States
Supreme Court had not expressly required such an extension. 445
The court relied upon the historical use of the peremptory chal-
lenge as justification for denying the State's motion. 446 Three Jus-
tices filed separate dissents, each arguing that the Supreme Court's
Edmonson and Powers decisions prohibited the use of discriminatory
strikes by every possible party, including the criminal defendant. 447
455 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
455 Id. at 2353-54.
4" See id. at 2353.
455 Id. at 2359.
459 Justices to Review Race as a Basis for Jury Exclusions, Georgia Prosecutors Call Practice
Unlawful, ATLANTA	 Nov. 4, 1991, at A3.
445 Id .
441 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2351.




445 Id. The court stated: "Bearing in mind the long history of jury trials as an essential
element of the protection of human rights, this court declines to diminish the free exercise
of peremptory strikes by a criminal defendant." Id.
441 McCollum, 405 S.E.2d at 689, 691, 693 (Hunt, J., Benham, J., Fletcher, J., dissenting
separately).
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In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Georgia Supreme
Court decision.448 The Court held that criminal defendants are
governed by the precedent established in Powers v. Ohio and Edmon-
son v. Leesville. 449 The Court reasoned that the McCollums' status as
criminal defendants was irrelevant to their right to employ per-
emptory challenges.450 To reach this conclusion, the Court em-
ployed a four-factor analysis: (1) whether a criminal defendant's
racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges inflicts the
harms addressed by Batson; (2) whether a criminal defendant's ex-
ercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action for the pur-
poses of the Equal Protection Clause; (3) whether the State has
third-party standing to challenge a defendant's discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges; and (4) whether a prohibition against
the discriminatory exercise of peremptory strikes violates a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights. 45 '
The Court began its analysis by reiterating that Batson protects
not only individual defendants but also the "dignity" of the excluded
jurors and the "integrity of the courts." 452 The Court noted that
regardless of who utilizes discriminatory strikes, the harm to the
juror, open and public discrimination, remains the same. 453 In ad-
dition, the Court stated that this harm undermines public confi-
dence in the judicial process. 454
The Court then discussed the need for public confidence in
jury selection procedures in race-related criminal trials.455
 The
Court emphasized that emotions in affected communities are es-
pecially volatile in circumstances involving race-related crimes. 456
The Court asserted that public confidence is as undermined by a
defendant obtaining an acquittal through use of discriminatory
strikes, as by circumstances where the State engages in discrimina-
tory jury selection and obtains a conviction.457
 Thus, the Court
448
	 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
"9 See id. at 2353-59.
450 See id. at 2357-59.
451 Id. at 2353.
452 Id. See supra notes 191-202 For a discussion of this reasoning in the Powers decision.
455 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353.
454 Id. at 2353-54.
455 Id. at 2354.
456
457 Id.
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concluded, public confidence in the integrity of the justice system
is necessary to maintain peace and order: 45s
The Court next acknowledged that although a criminal defen-
dant's strikes harm the excluded jurors and the community, this
harm was insufficient to establish an equal protection violation. 459
The Court observed that it was also necessary to consider whether
the acts of a criminal defendant could be state action. 46° Because all
cases other than Edmonson involved challenges made by prosecutors,
obvious state actors, the Court adopted the Edmonson analytical
framework.461
The Court began by reviewing the two-part inquiry utilized by
the Edmonson Court.462 The McCollum Court stated that the first
inquiry, "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation has re-
sulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in
state authority," was satisfied if the peremptory challenge is "per-
mitted only when the government, by statute or decisional law,
deems it appropriate to allow parties to exclude a given number of
persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service
on the petit jury."4" The Court determined that this first inquiry
was satisfied because the McGollums' right to use peremptory chal-
lenges was established by. Georgia statutory law.'"
The second inquiry, "whether the private party charged 'with
the deprivation can be described as a state actor" involves three
factors: "(I) the extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance and benefits; (2) whether the actor is performing a tra-
ditional governmental function; and (3) whether the injury caused
is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental
authority."465 The Court determined that defendants such as the
McCollums satisfied all three factors. 466 As to the first factor, the
Court noted that Edmonson held that the jury system as a whole
could not exist without overt government participation. 467 The
456 Id. This decision was released only a few months after the decision to acquit the




462 Id. This inquiry was adopted by the Edmonstm Court from the test set forth in Lugar
v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354 n.7.
4" Id. at 2354-55 (citations omitted).
464 Id. at 2355.
465 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
4fi6 See id. at 2355-56.
467 Id. at 2355.
1132	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:1081
Court then recognized that Georgia provides for the compilation
of jury lists, establishes criteria for jury services and for cultivating
a jury pool, summons jurors to Court under state authority, pays
jurors an expense allowance and administers an oath. 468 Thus, the
Court determined that the defendant in a Georgia criminal case
relies on government assistance and benefits equivalent to those
present in Edmonson. 469
The Court next considered the second factor, whether the
peremptory challenge can be considered a traditional government
function.470 The Court again relied on Edmonson's holding that the
sole purpose of peremptory challenges is to allow parties to assist
the government in selecting an impartial jury. 4" The Court noted
that Edmonson recognized that the purpose of the jury system is to
guard the rights of litigants and to ensure the "continued acceptance
of the laws by all of the people." 472 The Court concluded that the
peremptory challenge was even more tied to a traditional govern-
ment function in a criminal context because jury selection fulfills a
constitutionally compelled government function. 473
The Court ended its analysis under this second inquiry by
noting the Edmonson Court's observation that the courtroom setting
magnifies the harm of the private litigant's discriminatory strike and
adds to the perception of state action. 474 The McCollum Court stated
that this characterization was also true for criminal trials. 475 The
Court concluded that no matter what party engages in discrimina-
tory strikes, the strike will be perceived to be the work of the state. 476
Thus, the Court held that a criminal defendant's use of discrimi-
natory strikes is state action subject to constitutional restrictions. 477
The Court then distinguished the Polk County decision. 478 The
Court held that Polk County did not preclude a finding of state
action in all situations where a defender and the state are adversar-






472 Id. (internal citations omitted).
475
474 Id. at 2356.
475 1d.
476 ird.
477 Id. at 2357.
478 Id. at 2356.
479 Id.
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defender's adversarial relationship prevented the defender's public
employment from being sufficient to support a finding of state
action.48° The Court continued that whether a defender can be
considered a state actor depends on the nature and context of the
specific action in question. 48 ' The Court noted that it had previously
held that a public defender is a state actor when making personnel
decisions on behalf of a state. 482 The Court also noted that the Polk
County decision itself stated that public defenders might be consid-
ered state actors when performing administrative, and possibly in-
vestigative, functions.483
In conclusion, the Court asserted that the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges differed from other adversarial defense functions.484
The Court reasoned that the ability to use peremptory strikes to
select a jury was the power to choose government employees. 485
Thus, the Court determined that a defendant's use of peremptory
challenges is state action governed by the constitutional mandate of
race-neutrality. 486 The Court stated that whenever a private actor's
conduct is characterized as state action it is likely motivated by self-
interest and, therefore, defendants' use of discriminatory strikes to
serve their own interests does not preclude a finding of state ac-
tion.487
The McCollum Court next addressed whether the State has
standing to mount a Batson attack. 488 The Court began by reiterating
that Powers held that a white criminal defendant has standing to
raise the equal protection rights of excluded jurors. 489 The Court
also noted that in Edmonson, the Court applied the Powers three-
part standing analysis to determine that civil litigants can raise an
excluded juror's equal protection rights. 49°
The Court first asserted that the State suffers a cognizable
injury, satisfying the first prong of the standing analysis, when the
"D Id.
" I Id.






4" Id. at 2356-57.
"a Id. at 2357.
405 1d. The Court reiterated that under Powers, a litigant has standing to assert a claim
for a third party if: (1) the litigant suffered a concrete injury; (2) the litigant has a close
relationship to the third party; and (3) the third party is unable to protect his or her own
interest. Id.
49° Id.
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fairness and integrity of the judicial process is undermined."' The
Court then explained that the second prong of the standing analysis,
a close relationship with the third party, is satisfied because such a
relationship is established between the State and the juror during
voir dire.492 Finally, the third prong, inability of the third party to
raise the claim, is satisfied because "barriers to a suit by an excluded
juror are daunting."493 Thus, the Court held that the State has
standing to assert the rights of excluded jurors. 494
Finally, the McCollum Court held that the rights of the criminal
defendant are not greater than the interests served by Batson. 495
First, the Court pointed out that peremptory challenges are not
protected by the Constitution.496
 The Court noted that the peremp-
tory challenge has "very old credentials" and noted that a litigant's
ability to help shape the jury is one reason why the jury system and
jury verdicts are widely accepted. 497 The Court reiterated, however,
the Edmonson Court's observation that "if race stereotypes are the
price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair . . . such a price is too
high to meet the standard of the Constitution." 498
 Thus, the Court
concluded that the exercise of racially motivated peremptory chal-
lenges is unconstitutional. 499
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas each filed concur-
rences.50° Justices O'Connor and Scalia dissented separately. 50 ' In a
one-paragraph opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that al-
though he believed Edmonson was decided wrongly, he also believed
the Court was bound by its precedent and therefore joined the
majority's conclusion. 5°2
 Justice Thomas also emphasized his belief
491 Id. The Court explained that the Powers Court found that criminal defendants suffer
cognizable injury because racial discrimination casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process and the Edmonson Court held that this injury was not limited to the criminal sphere.
Id.
492 Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1991)). The Court described the
State as having an even closer relationship with the excluded juror than the criminal defen-
dant because the State is the "logical and proper" party to defend the excluded juror's
constitutional rights. Id.
4" Id, (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111  S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991)).
494
 Id.




	 (internal quotations omitted).
499 Id. at 2359.
569 Id.
561 Id. at 2361, 2364.
3°2 Id. at 2359 (Rehnquist, CI, concurring in the judgment).
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that the McCollums were governed by Edmonson. 5 U3 Justice Thomas
noted that although he therefore joined the decision, he was dis-
pleased that constitutional restraints were placed on peremptory
challenges. 504 Justice Thomas asserted that McCollum was an unfa-
vorable decision for African-American criminal defendants. 505 He
explained that in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the racial composition of a jury may affect the outcome
of a criminal proceeding. 506 Therefore, according to Justice
Thomas, Strauder rested on the assumption that all-white juries
might unfairly judge African-American criminal defendants. 507
Thus, continued Justice Thomas, members of the defendant's race
who sit on the jury can overcome racial bias and help the defendant
obtain a fair trial. 508
In Batson, stated Justice Thomas, the Court moved away from
Strauder by holding that "without some actual showing," supposi-
tions that certain jurors may harbor racial prejudice are illegiti-
rnate. 509
 Justice Thomas recognized negative consequences resulting
from the McCollum decision. 51 ° Justice Thomas asserted that the
decision prioritized a citizen's right to sit on a jury over the rights
503 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
"4 M. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 1 1 1 S. Ct. 1364
(1991); Echnonson v. Leesville, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991)). Justice Thomas asserted that Batson
and its progeny subverted the reasoning and result of Strauder v. West Virginia. Id. See
supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Strauder decision.
505 Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Some evidence exists supporting
Justice Thomas' conclusion that minority defendants' ability to secure representative juries
will be harmed by the McCollum decision. See State v. Carr, 413 S.E.2d 192, 193 (Ga.), petition
for cert. filed, (1992). In the 1992 case of Slate v. Carr, decided before Georgia v. McCollum,
the Georgia Supreme Court held that an African-American criminal defendant is not pro-
hibited from using racially motivated peremptory strikes. Id. at 193. Carr involved Willie J.
Carr, an African-American man indicted for drug-related offenses. Id, at 192. Carr used all
of his peremptory challenges to remove white panelists. Id. Georgia used two peremptory
strikes and removed two African-American panelists. Id. The jury consisted of eleven African-
Americans and one Hispanic. Id.
The State then requested that the court require Carr to give race-neutral explanations
for his challenges. Id. The court refused, reasoning that its decision in State v. McCollum was
controlling. Id. at 193. One justice, in a special concurrence, noted that the concurrence
preserved the question of a criminal defendant's ability to use racially motivated strikes
pending the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. McCollum. Id. at 193 (Fletcher, J., con-
curring specially). Thus, the court established that the ability of African-American criminal
defendants to use racially motivated strikes would be governed by the Supreme Court decision
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of criminal defendants, and left defendants with less ability to pro-
tect themselves. 5 " Justice Thomas concluded that the Court ignored
the benefits derived when members of the criminal defendant's race
sit on the jury, benefits recognized in Strauder. 512
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor contended that the
majority opinion was unfaithful to the precedent that established
that criminal defendants and their counsel are not government
actors when performing traditional trial functions. 513
 Justice O'Con-
nor argued that criminal defendants are not state actors and thus
not subject to equal protection restraints. 514 She asserted that the
Court did not engage in a realistic appraisal of the relationship
between the criminal defendant and the government acting as ac-
cuser.515
Justice O'Connor asserted that Polk County held that a public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing
traditional defense functions. 516
 She explained that defense lawyers
are adversaries of the state and that defense lawyers best serve the
public by not acting in concert with the state. 517 Furthermore, noted
Justice O'Connor, the independence of defense counsel is consti-
tutionally mandated. 5 ' 8
Justice O'Connor argued that the majority's opinion ignored
Polk County's holding that criminal defense is a private function, not
state action. 519
 She emphasized that the majority attempted to ra-
tionalize its decision by characterizing defendants as state actors
when making peremptory challenges but government adversaries
when performing other defense functions. 52° This reasoning failed,
511 Id. Also, according to Justice Thomas, the decision continued a slippery slope Batson
began. Id. The Justice explained that the Court would eventually have to decide whether
African-American defendants could strike white venirepersons and whether peremptories
could be exercised on basis of gender. Id. at 2360-61 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
512 1d. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).




717 Id. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
515 /d. (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 (1981) (quoting Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))). O'Connor put forth that "Gideon v. Wainwright 'estab-
lished the right of state criminal defendants to the guiding hand of counsel at every step of
the proceeding against [them]'.... Implicit in this right is the assumption that counsel will
be free of state control. There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of
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however, according to justice O'Connor, because peremptory chal-
lenges are a traditional defense function. 521
Moreover, continued justice O'Connor, a private party's exer-
cise of a privilege created by the state is not state action if initiated
by the private party. 522 The government does not influence the
criminal defendant's decision to use peremptory challenges. 523 As a
result, concluded Justice O'Connor, the criminal defendant is an
adversary of the state and, under Polk County, cannot be considered
a state actor. 524
Justice O'Connor completed her dissent by explaining that the
majority seemed preoccupied with ensuring non-discriminatory
jury selection procedures. 525 Justice O'Connor reminded the major-
ity that only the government can be held to constitutional con-
straints. 526 Moreover, continued Justice O'Connor, the McCollum
decision might fail to advance non-discriminatory criminal justice. 527
According to justice O'Connor, the decision will inhibit minority
defendants from securing minority representation on juries. 528 Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded that "[i]n a world where the outcome of
a minority defendant's trial may turn on the misconceptions or
biases of white jurors, there is cause to question the implications of
this Court's good intentions." 529
Finally, Justice Scalia, referring to the Edmonson dissents, also
dissented from the majority decision. 53° justice Scalia joined in Jus-
tice O'Connor's analysis, although he disagreed with her argument
that McCollum could be distinguished from Edmonson. 53 ' Like Justice
O'Connor, justice Scalia concluded with an admonishment that the
Court's desire to promote good race relations would harm criminal
defendants' ability to obtain fair trials. 532
521 Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S, 202, 212-19 (1965); Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).
522 Id. at 2363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
523 Id.
524 Id. O'Connor stated that Edmonson did not render Polk County's holding inapplicable
to criminal defendants as Edrnonson only dealt with civil litigants who are, by definition, not
in adversarial relationships with the government. Id.





5" See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id, at 2365 (Scalia„1., dissenting).
532m
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V. ANALYSIS
Balancing the use of discriminatory challenges by a defendant
against the inherently ugly presence of racial discrimination in a
courtroom is not simple. Situations such as those presented in State
v. Kern and Georgia v. McCollum disturb society's sense of fairness. 533
It seems only right and reasonable that members of the victim's
community have a vested interest in participating in the ensuing
judicial proceedings. It appears unfair that defendants might ma-
nipulate a jury by striking members of the victim's community.
Still, this country holds a deep-seated notion that criminal de-
fendants deserve special deference. 534 Of all persons present in the
courtroom, only the criminal defendant faces loss of life and lib-
erty. 535 For this reason the defendant deserves protection from any
vigilante justice that might result from the link between victim and
community. It is fundamental to the American judicial system that
a defendant receive a fair, impartial tria1. 536
In McCollum, the United States Supreme Court faced an unen-
viable dilemma: either allow the defendant to strike jurors for no
apparent reason other than race, or deny the criminal defendant a
traditional right. The Court chose to remove the traditional defen-
dant right. 537 The Court's decision should not have been unex-
pected. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Edmonson, made
the Court's agenda clear: racial discrimination has no place in the
courtroom, regardless of whether the proceedings are civil or crim-
inal.538 The Powers and Edmonson decisions indicated the depth of
the Supreme Court's hostility toward racially motivated peremptory
strikes while laying the groundwork for the McCollum decision. 539
Although only a few years ago it appeared unimaginable that the
prohibition such as the one articulated in Batson v. Kentucky could
ever reach criminal defendants, 54° the Court's activity in 1991 cre-
ated precedent that made the McCollum decision inevitable.
"' See supra notes 378-403 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Kern case,
and notes 435-532 and accompanying text for a discussion of the McCollum decision.
33' See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional defendant
rights.
535 Id,
535 See supra notes 38-76 and accompanying text.
337 See supra notes 435-532 and accompanying text for a discussion of the McCallum
decision.
333 111  S. Ct. 2077,2088 (1991).
333 See supra notes 174-250 and 275-354 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Powers and Edmonson decisions.
54(> See Powers v. Ohio, I I 1 S. Ct. 1364,1376 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Over the course of 1990 and 1991, the Supreme Court did
three things that foreshadowed the extension of Batson to criminal
defendants. First, in Holland v. Illinois, the Court rejected the Sixth
Amendment as a means for prohibiting discriminatory strikes."'
Next, the Court was increasingly prolific regarding its hostility to-
ward discrimination in the courtroom. 542 Finally, in Powers v. Ohio
and Edmonson v. Leesville, the Court created a solution for noted
obstacles to extending Batson. 543
Support for the argument that McCollum was inevitable is pro-
vided by examining the Court's decision in Holland v. Illinois. In
Holland, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment provides no
basis for raising a challenge to the use of discriminatory strikes. 544
Holland involved a white defendant who objected to a prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to remove African-American venire-
persons. 545 The Holland Court reasoned that the fair cross section
requirement of the Sixth Amendment applies to the venire, but not
the petit jury. 546
An extension of the Sixth Amendment would have allowed any
defendant, regardless of race, to object to the exclusion of an iden-
tifiable group of persons from the jury process. 547 The State, how-
ever, has no Sixth Amendment right. The Sixth Amendment would
not allow a prosecutor to challenge defense peremptories. 548 Nor
would the Sixth Amendment permit the Court to use an injury to
the dismissed venireperson as grounds for a constitutional challenge
to race-based strikes, because jurors, like the State, are not afforded
rights under the Sixth Amendment. 51° Therefore, the only avenue
available for the Court to prohibit defendants from discriminatorily
using peremptory challenges was the Fourteenth Amendment.
Commentators both for and against the extension of Batson
acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment was not obviously
applicable to criminal defendants. 55° These commentators noted
54 ' 483 U.S. 474,480.
5" See Edmonson v. Leesville, 1 11 S. Ct. 2077,2081 (1991); Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1366;
Holland, 493 U.S. at 481.
545
	 infra notes 553-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Powers resolved
the standing obstacle and notes 563-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
Edmonson resolved the state action obstacle.
544
	 U.S. at 478.
545
	 at 476.
5" Id. at 476-77.
541 Id. at 477.
5" See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text; see also Zirlin supra note 26, at 243-47.
5" See supra note 42 for the text of the Sixth Amendment.
"'See Alschuler, supra note 27, at 198; Goldwasser, supra note 13, at 811-20.
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that both the government's standing to assert a Batson challenge
and the characterization of defense strikes as state action were
problematic. 55 ' In addressing the standing of racially dissimilar de-
fendants in Powers, and the use of peremptory challenges by civil
litigants in Edmonson, however, the Court created precedent that
made it possible for the Court to declare that it had no choice but
to extend the Batson rule. 552
By reinterpreting existing precedent to allow defendants to
challenge the state exclusion of a juror, whether or not the defen-
dant and the juror were of the same race, the Powers Court elimi-
nated the standing obstacle that prevented the extension of Batson
to criminal defendants."' Commentators had asserted that, because
the State has no equal protection rights, it could not claim that a
criminal defendant's racially discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges violated those rights. 551
 In order for a prosecutor to invoke
Batson, therefore, a state needed authority to assert the claims of
another.
In Powers, the Court asserted that the excluded juror has an
equal protection right that the State violates when it discriminatorily
strikes the juror. 555
 Moreover, the Court determined that someone
other than the excluded juror must vindicate those rights when
violated. 55" Therefore, the Court held that defendants may raise
the claim of the excluded juror. 557
 By creating a basis for third-
party standing, however, the Court also opened the door to prose-
cutorial challenges. If, after Powers, a criminal defendant used ra-
cially motivated peremptory strikes, the State could arguably bring
a Fourteenth Amendment claim to vindicate the excluded juror's
rights.
Under the Powers reasoning, however, the State could not rely
upon third-party standing unless the State could satisfy three cri-
teria: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) close relationship with the injured party;
and (3) some hinderance preventing the injured party from pro-
tecting his or her own interest. 558
 The second criteria (relationship)
and third criteria (obstacle) are obviously fulfilled under the Powers
55I Id .
552 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,2358 (1092).
5" k 1 1 S. Ct. at 1374-77,
554
 GOI(lWaSSer, supra note 13, at 811-20; Zirlin, supra note 26. at 238-43.
555 l l S. Ct. at 1370.
556
 Id. at 1373.
557
558 Id. at 1370-71.
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characterization as applied to criminal defendants seeking third-
party standing. 559 Still, unless the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by the criminal defendant caused the State some cogniz-
able injury, the State would not be able to assert the excluded juror's
equal protection right. In Powers, Justice Kennedy described as a
cognizable injury the doubt cast on the integrity of the judicial
process as well as the doubt placed on the fairness of the proceeding
by racial discrimination in the selection of jurors. 56" According to
the Powers Court, both the defendant and the excluded juror share
an interest in eliminating racial discrimination in the courtroom. 56 '
Although Powers involved a defendant seeking to object to the per-
emptories, certainly this is the kind of injury equally suffered, and
interest shared, by the government as by a defendant. As a result,
the State could argue that Powers created a basis for granting it
third-party standing.
Finally, the Powers holding resolved the third-party standing
problem raised by the State's racial neutrality. Under Batson, defen-
dants could only raise objections to the exclusion of members of
the same group background. 5"2 The government, of course, has no
race or group identity. Therefore, under a strict reading of Batson,
the State would never be able to challenge the defense's strikes. The
application of third-party standing to challenge peremptory strikes
avoids this difficulty. As a result of the Powers decision, defendants
received standing to assert third-party claims of jurors subjected to
prosecutorial discrimination, regardless of race. 563 Powers, there-
fore, provided the basis for granting prosecutors standing under
the guise of protecting jurors' constitutional rights.
The Edmonson decision also circumvented noted obstacles. In
particular, Edmonson neatly resolved the argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not apply to a criminal defendant's use of
peremptory challenges because the defendant was not a state ac-
tor. 5"4 Generally, racial discrimination only violates the Constitution
when attributable to state action. 5"5 In Edmonson, the Court held
that the use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial is state action. 566
559 See supra notes 205-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three-part test.
56') 1 1 1 S. Ct. at 1371.
561 Id. at 1371-72.
562 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986).
563 I I I S. Ct. at 1373.
564 See supra notes 302-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's char-
acterization of the use of peremptory challenges as state action.
565 See supra notes 252-54, 275-81 and accompanying text.
," III S. Ct. at 21195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The Court focused on three factors that implicate the government
in the use of peremptory challenges. First, peremptory challenges
are granted either by the legislature or by common law.567 Next,
because jury selection is a traditional government function, and
because the judge generally controls jury selection, the peremptory
challenge can be viewed as a delegation of government power to a
private person. 568 Finally, the court is a public forum and therefore
the offensiveness of racial discrimination is aggravated by the pres-
ence of state authority.569 As a result, Edmonson extended Batson to
civil litigants and non-governmental parties. The reasoning that
turned a civil defendant into a state actor may be applied with equal
vigor to a criminal defendant.
The Batson, Powers and Edmonson holdings constrained the de-
fendant's use of the peremptory challenge. The Powers and Edmon-
son decisions provided precedent for the Court to argue that the
Fourteenth Amendment reaches the criminal defendant. Still, in
order for the constitutional prohibitions against discriminatory
strikes to reach the criminal defendant, the Court needed to con-
clude that the exercise of peremptory strikes is state action.
In Batson, the Court held that a state prosecutor cannot employ
racially motivated strikes. 579
 The Batson District Attorney was clearly
a state actor; he represented and was employed by the state. In Polk
County, the Court held that a public defender does not act under
color of state law when performing traditional defense functions."'
The Court noted that defense counsel opposes the designated gov-
ernment representative. 572 This adversarial relationship is essen-
tially a government function. 573 Thus, the Court ruled that a public
defender is not a state actor when performing as an adversary of
the state. 574 The Polk County Court emphasized that the adversarial
relationship is in the public interest, assisting in the advancement
of truth and fairness.'"
Peremptory strikes, like the traditional defense functions at
issue in Polk County, are adversarial behavior. The Court has de-
667 See supra notes 302-06 and accompanying text.
'6" See supra notes 307-19 and accompanying text.
'69 See supra notes 322-26 and accompanying text.
599 476 U.S. at 89.
'9$ 454 U.S. 312,325 (1981).
5 Y2 /d. at 318.
595 Id. at 318-19.
"94 Id. at 325.
595 Id. at 318.
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scribed the Sixth Amendment as creating an equal starting point
from which the adversaries engage in strikes in order to remove
any bias in favor of the opponent. 576 The purpose of the peremp-
tory, according to the Court, is to prevent each party from obtaining
an advantage at the expense of the other party. 577 This is certainly
adversarial action.
The McCollum decision ignores the importance of the indepen-
dent position of defense counsel recognized in Polk County. 578 De-
fense counsel guide defendants through each step of the trial pro-
ceedings. In order to be effective in this role it is imperative that
counsel be free of state control. If the decision when to employ
peremptory challenges can be regulated because it is state action,
other rights granted to the defendant can likewise be limited. With
defense counsel under the thumb of the state, the effective repre-
sentation of the defendant is compromised.
Moreover, the Edmonson decision contains further evidence that
precedent did not justify the McCollum decision on state action. In
Edmonson v. Leesville, the Court ruled that private litigants can be
state actors. 579 The Court was careful, however, to distinguish its
reasoning in light of Polk County. 58° First, the Court noted that civil
litigants have no adversarial relationship with the government.58 '
Also, the state provides a forum for a private dispute. 5 fl 2 The use
of the court is a privilege provided by the state. 583 The circumstances
of the criminal defendant, however, are clearly different. When the
criminal defendant is present in the courtroom, the government is
a party to the dispute, and the defendant is not in the courtroom
by permission but by demand.
Furthermore, in Edmonson, the Court noted that the determi-
nation of state action is a question of fact. 584 In order to be a state
actor three criteria must be met: reliance on government assistance
and benefits; participation in a traditional government function;
576 See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
5" Id.
578 See supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's char-
acterization of defense counsel as private actors.
579 See supra notes 282-354 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Edmonson
decision.
569 I l I S. Ct. at 2086.
58 Id.
582 Id. at 2087.
585 Id.
584 Id. at 2083.
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and injury aggravated by incidence of government authority. 585 The
criminal defendant does not rely upon government assistance or
benefits, nor is criminal defense a traditional government function.
Private defense counsel obviously receive no government assistance,
and the public defender has been separated from government while
acting as counsel. 588 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot
justify describing criminal defense as a traditional government func-
tion. Criminal defense is not done exclusively, or even primarily, by
the government. The legislative authorization of peremptory chal-
lenges should no more be considered a government benefit than
any constitutionally or legislatively bestowed right.
In stretching to reach criminal defendants, the Court relied on
poor reasoning. The accused cannot logically be considered a state
actor when exercising the constitutional right to defend against the
deprivation of life or liberty by the state. The use of peremptory
strikes to remove potentially biased jurors is an act of defense
against the state. Furthermore, although these challenges are
granted by the state, and take place in a courtroom, the prohibition
is not justified by prior decisions.
Even more disturbing than the Court's narrow use of precedent
is the effect of its decision. In an ideal world, courts could distin-
guish between the racially motivated strike and a strike used to
prevent discrimination by removing a juror who the defendant
believes harbors racial prejudice.587 In reality, it will be difficult,
however, to distinguish between the two situations. 588 Because the
defendant faces such severe penalties, an imperfect device is better
than no device. Whatever the injury to the excluded juror, it cannot
compare to the injury sustained by a defendant convicted by a
prejudiced jury. 589
As a result of the McCollum decision, the criminal defendant is
more likely to be tried by a jury of persons whom the defendant
suspects are biased. 59° Because voir dire is ineffective for eliminating
all but the most blatantly biased jurors, the peremptory is the only
585 Id.
588 See supra notes 255-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Polk Counly
decision.
587 See Brief for Respondent at 4, Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (No. 92-732).
588 Id.
585 But cf. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 (discrimination is too high a price to pay for
allowance of defendants' use of unrestricted peremptory strikes).
59° See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relative merits
of for cause and peremptory challenges.
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true means of ensuring that criminal defendants believe their juries
harbor no prejudice. As a result of the McCollum decision, the
defendant is required to accept state-selected jurors. Defendants
are thus dependent upon their prosecutors to ensure the impar-
tiality of their jury. Clearly, this is not compatible with the Court's
concern for appearances of judicial fairness. 59 '
The McCollum Court subverted the historical purpose of the
peremptory challenge and ignored the special position of the crim-
inal defendant. Traditionally, peremptory challenges have served
to assist the interests of the accused, not promote a state interest in
securing a representative jury in a non-discriminatory manner. 592
Of all potential parties in any trial, only the criminal defendant
faces the loss of liberty, even life. The McCollum Court concluded,
however, that even if the accused receives special deference in the
criminal justice system, the right of prospective jurors to be consid-
ered for participation in the jury outweighs the right of a defendant
in a criminal action to use a peremptory strike. 593 The McCollum
Court emphatically asserted that "if race stereotypes are the price
for acceptance of a jury panel as fair' . . . such a 'price is too high
to meet the standard of the Constitution.'" 594 This weighing of the
interests results in a division of power balanced in favor of the State.
VI. CONCLUSION
McCollum provided a sympathetic case for the Court's further
expansion of Batson. Certainly the idea of keeping African-Ameri-
cans off this jury, where the crime was allegedly one of hate, sounds
abhorrent and seems a perfect illustration of the kind of bigotry
originally challenged in Batson. The defense peremptory fell victim
to the Court's commitment to its assertion that discriminatory chal-
lenges harm the juror and the community.
Because this assertion was a forceful theme in both the Powers
and the Edmonson decisions, it was reasonable to expect that the
Court would again focus on this personal and societal harm when
examining McCollum. The Supreme Court's recent activity indicated
59 See Powers, Ill S. Ct. at 1372.
592 See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
"s 112 S. Ct. at 2358.
59' Id. See supra notes 495-99 for a discussion of the Court's reasoning regarding per-
emptory challenges as a traditional defendants' right. This line of reasoning directly conflicts
with the Court's earlier emphasis on the need for public acceptance of the judicial system as
free from bias and reliance on public belief in judicial integrity to establish an equal protection
injury. See supra notes 451-57.
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a predisposition of a majority of the Justices to agree with the
assertion by Justice Marshall in his Batson concurrence: the discrim-
inatory use of the peremptory challenge by criminal defendants is
not compatible with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 595 Moreover, despite his obvious disapproval, Justice
Scalia clearly believed that the Edmonson reasoning was applicable
to defense counsel.596
It was clear that the defendant's unchecked use of peremptory
challenges was certain to fall in McCollum. The Court's pre-McCollum
activity indicated that the Court had concluded that the affront to
the dignity of excluded jurors outweighed any advantage secured
to the defendant through unmonitored peremptory strikes. By
characterizing the injury to excluded jurors as constitutionally pro-
hibited, the Court made the fate of the discriminatory challenge
clear. Having eliminated the problems of standing and state action,
the peremptory challenge, not constitutionally guaranteed, could
not survive a Batson attack.
SHARON LEIGH NELLES
395 See Raison, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring).
396 111 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
